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Eclwa ,-..d B. _Jl?.ocl( ·'*
and lVIidwel L Wachter" ''
I NTRODUCT ION

Courts have struggled repeated ly to defi w;: the legal obligations of
the buyer of a business that has unionized 'Norkers. This is the domain
of the " labor law successorship doctrine." 1 Beginni ng with Jo hn Wiley & Sons, In c. v. L ivingston 2 in 1964, the Supreme Court has addressed the iss ue five times over the ensu ing years . 3 T he N ational
Labor R elations Board (the Board) and the lower courts ha ve decided
coun tless successorship cases. Despite or perhaps because of this constant attention , many commen tators have argued that the doctrine with its dis ti nction among mergers, stock sales, asset sales, and shifts
of work - is confusing, formalistic, an d arbitrary. 4
* P ro fessor o f Law, Uni ve rsit y o f Pe nn sy lvani a. B.S. 1977, Ya le U ni vers it y; B.A . 1980,
Un ivers it y of O xfo rd ; J. D . 1983 , University of P en nsy lva nia. - Ed.

** W illi am B. Jo hn son Professor of Law a nd Econom ics a nd Di rec to r, In stitut e fo r Law
an d Eco nomi cs, University of Pennsylv a nia. B.S. 1964, Co rn e ll Uni ve rsit y; M .A. 196 7, Ph.D.
1970, H a rva rd Uni versit y. - Ed .. We a re g rat eful to R obe rt Go rm a n, J ason J oh ns to n , H owa rd
Lesnic k , a nd C ly de Summers fo r co mm en ts, criti cism , and d isc ussio ns. We exp lici tly a bso lve
t he m of any respons ibilit y fo r wha t fo ll ow s. We a lso bene fi ted e norm ous ly fro m t he co mm en ts of
pa rtici pa nts in th e Y al e Law , Ec o no mi cs an d O rga niz a tio n Wo rk sho p an d t he Un iv e rsity of
Pe nn sy lvani a's In stitut e fo r La w a nd Eco nomics Labor Law Roundtable. Thi s resea rc h was
su pport ed b y the U nive rsity of P enn sy lv ani a's Ins ti tut e for Law a nd E cono m ics.
1. For a com pre he nsive account , see i TH E DEV ELOPI!':G L-'.BOR L AW 76 1- 850 (P a tri ck
Hardin ed ., 3d ed. 1992 ).
2. 376 U.S 543 ( 1964).
3. f-a ll Ri ve r Dye in g & F ini shin g C orp. v NLRB, 482 US . 27 ( 198 7); H ow a rd J o hnso n Co .
v. Detro it Local Joint Exec u tive Bd., 417 U .S . 249 (i97-l ); Go lden S la te Bo tt lin g Co. v. NLR B,
41 4 U. S. 168 ( 1973); NLRB v. Bur ns In ti. Sec . Sen·s., Inc.. 406 U. S. 272 ( 1972); Joh n Wil ey &
Sons , Inc. v. Liv ingston , 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
4. See, e.g., D OU GLAS L. L ESLiE, L.-\HOR L.',W i;-; A NL' T SH EI. L 289 -3 00 (3d eel. 199 2)
("Sup reme Co urt cases o n t he ri ghts of a uni o n in successorship situat io ns have t raveled a
t wis ted pa th reach ing r esu lts th a t are oft en susce pti ble to ma ni pu lat io n by a successo r em p lo yer
who wants to rid h im se lf of a un ion."); David L. Be neta r, Successors/up Liabili1y Under Labor
Agreemen ls, 1973 Wis. L. R EV. 1026, 1026 (noti ng a fun damen ta l d itTe ren ce in j udi cia l phil osophy be t ween Wiley a nd Burns), 1036 (cal li ng Wil<'y ~md Burns "dec isions headed in oppos it e
directi ons" ); Sue J. H enry, Is There A r/;irru rion Afr er Burns'i : The R cs urrec lion of Joh n W iley &
Sons, 3 1 V.\ND. L. R EV. 249, 249 -50 ( 1978) ('"The d~ve ! op ment o f th e federa l labo r law dea lin g
wi t h th e o bli ga tion s of a successo r corpora te em pl uye r based u pon the predecessor e mpl oye r's
co ll ec tive bargain in g ag ree ment - t he so-ca ll ed 'suc cesso rship doct r ine ' - has been confus in g.
in co mpl et e an d , ap pare ntly, incon sisten t." ) (foo t no te o m itted); Cha rle s J. M or ris & Will iam
Gaus, Successorship and !he Colleclive Bargaining Agreemenl: ."Jccummodaling W il ey and Burn s,
59 VA. L. R EV . 1359 , 1360 (1 9 73) (" [T ]he Wiley and the Bu m s de cisio ns exis t at pr esen t side by
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Critics from the labor law perspective have viewed the development of the doctrine as largely wrong, as an unfortunate dilution of
worker protection, and as an indefen sible falling a\vay from the protections afforded workers under Wiley. 5 The courts the mselves have
recogn ized the difficulties in the doctrine.6 Commen tatcrs from a corporate law perspective have been equally but oppositely perplexed, unable to discover any principled basis for what seerns to be excessive
wo rker protection. 7
In this article, we take an approach fundamentall y d ifferen t from
that of the labor law commentators. We start from a broader perspective than is common: successorship is as important an issue for corporate law as it is for labor law . Given that the two principal inputs to
the firm are labor and capital, it would be surprising if the laws for
labor law successorship were com pletely different from the laws for
corporate law successorship. To the extent that differences exist, those
differences should hinge upon differences between the employees' and
the creditors' relationships with the firm.
What distinguishes the employees' relationship from that of others
who contract with the firm is what economists term the "internal labor market" - the ongoing web of contractual and noncontractual
understandings governing the employer-employee relationship which,
when efficient, yields a surplus above that available in the external labor market. In this article, we show that internal -labor-market theory
provides the element that the cases and the commentary have most
si de, p rese ntin g th e lowe r co urt s with th e vexing tas k o f att e mp t ing to reco nc il e th e ir see min g ly
irreconcilab le holdings."); Loc k Holm es, Comment , Contracwal Succr!ssorship: Th e Impa ct of
Burns. 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 617 ( 1973) (" "Burns and Wiley are n o t easily reco nciled.'"); Note. The
Impact of Howard Johnson on the L abo r Obligations of 1he Successor F:."mployer. 74 MICH. L.
REV. 555, 555 ( 1976) (noting that th e Supreme Court '" has reac hed see min g ly in co ns is tent co nc lusion s·· in succ esso rship cases ).
5. 376 U.S. at 548. See generally LESLIE, supra note .:t, at 289 -300. Note, Th e Bargaining
Oblig111 ions of Su ccessor Employers. 88 HARV. L. REv . 7 59 ( 197 5); Jam es Se verso n & Michael
W illcoxo n, Comm e nt. Successorship Under Howard j o h nson: Short Order Justice for Employees,
64 CAl.. L. REv. 795 (1976) . But cf Keith N . H ylton & Maria 0. Hyl to n. Rr!nl Appropriation
and rh e Lahar Law Doctrin e of Successo rship. 70 B. U. L. R EV . S21 ( 1990) (express ing views
consistent with th ose devel oped herein).
6. For exampl e, in Howard Johnson the Court s tat ed : ""The co urt s be low recog ni zed that t he
reaso ning o f Wiley was to so me extent inconsistent with our more recent de cision in [Burns}."
417 U.S. at 254. The Court added:

Parti c ularly in li g ht of th e difficulty o f the successo rship qu~ s tion. t he my riad factu~li circ um s ta nces and lega l co nt e xts in which it can a ri se. a nd th .: a bse n ct.: of cong ress io na l gu idance as to it s resoiuti o n. emp has is on the fac ts of each case as it aris es is es pecially
appropriate. Th e Court wa s obviou sly well awa re of thi s in Wiley. as its guard ed. almost
tent ative statem e nt of its h o lding amply demonstrates.
417 U.S. at 256.
7. RO:--JALD J . G ILSO:--J & BE RI".'\l{ i) S. BL\ CK, T HE L\W
ACQUISITIONS 1149-52 (Su pp. 1993).
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lacked : a positive theory of labor law successorship. 8 T o the extent

that

om~

believes that courts should help parties maxi mize their joint

gains, at least when doing so imposes no costs on others, the economics of internal la bor markets provides a normative th eory a.s well.
In app lying corpo rate law's successors h ip taxonom y to organize
tf1 ·~ labor la.w cases, \Ve reach a s u rpri si ~n g conclusion . r.\Jt 't-101.1 gl1 t h :~
courts, the Board , (-ind n1a·ny labor la\v cornrnentators ·h ~3.~~.~e clc.i:n1ec1
t hat the form of the cocpo rate transaction does not , [~. n d sh o u1d not
matter - that " form" should not be elevated over " :;;_: bsts. nc e' ' - - the
contrary seems tru e. We can almost perfectly predict th e outcome of
the cases based on the corporate form of the transacti on. By showing
why the corporate form of a transaction matters in labor law, this article provides a relatively simple, positive ex planation of what heretofore has been a confusing area of labor law. 9
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we provide a taxonomy of the
background corporate law successorship doctrine, •.vhich governs the
rights of creditors other than employees when a business is sold . In
Part II , using a parallel taxonomy, we describe the current state of
labor law successorship doctrine, noting the places where it diverges
from the more general corporate law doctri ne . In Part I II, we introduce and summarize the economics of internal labor markets . Finally,
in Part IV, we use the economics of internal labor markets to understand labor law successorship doctrine and to explain its unique features. We conclude by summari zing the respective contributions that
the form of the t ransaction and the dynamics of t he employ;-nent re lationship make to a proper understanding of successorsh ip doctrine.
1

I.

SU CCESSORSHIP IN CORPORATE LAW:

A TAXON OMY

In corporate law, successorship liability issues revo lve around tw o
distinction s. The first distinction is between m ergers a nd asset sales.
State corporate law codes provide that, when two fi rms merge, the
surv ivin g firm (or the new firm) succeeds to the liabilities of the
merged firm or firms automatica lly, as a matter of law. 10 T he same
rule applies to sales of stock: when a firm is acqui red thro ugh the
acqu isi tion of its stock, the firm automatically retains all prior liabiliS. As such, our general approach resembles Kenn elh G . Dau -SchmiJt. A Barga ining Analysis of Am erican L abor L aw and !he Search for Bargaining Equitv and !nduslriol ?~ace. 9 1 M I C II .
L. REV. 4 19 (1992).
9. Through our ta xo nom y we intend largely to replace the tra diti o na l la bor law ana lysi s that
turns on th e dut y a t iss ue , suc h as the duty to arbitrate, th e duly to adh ere tu th e co nt ract. the
dut y to bargain, and th e duty to redress unfair labor practices .
10. S ee. e.g.. DEL . CoDE At'N. tit. 8, § 259 (199 1).
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ties because the corporation has an independent legal existence. In
contrast, when the successor firm acquires some or all of the assets of
the predecesso r firm, the general rule is that the successor does not
assume any liabilities, except as negotiated. 11 As described below, the
general rule has always been subject to exceptions, and, in recent
years, several new exceptions have emerged.
\Vhy has corporate law traditionally drawn such a sharp distinction between mergers and asset sales? A core justification is a desire to
protect creditors while minimizing transaction costs. 12 The merger
statute provides an inexpensive, off-the-rack form to transfer a whole
business as a going concern with minimal interruption of established
legal and economic relationships. 13 T hus, transferring control by a
merger or stock sale typically leaves intact all contracts, leases, and
licenses. 14
When, on the other hand , the parties desire to transfer assets without trc.nsferring the entire business as a going concern, an asset sale is
preferable. 15 Thus, if only a portion of the assets are being transferred,
if a firm is being liquidated after business failure, or if the seller values
some significant assets or liabilities more highly than the buyer does,
the parties typically will choose to structure the transaction as a sale of
assets, rather than as a merger, and identify specifically which assets
and liabilities are transferred. 16 So long as the buyer pays fair market
value for the assets it buys, creditors of the seller, subject to the qualifi cation discussed below, 17 are made better off by a rule that permits the
II. 15 WILLIAM M. FL ETCHER, FLETCHER
RATIO NS§ 7122 ( pe rm . ed. rev. vol. 1990).

CY C~O PEDIA

OF THE LAW OF PRIVA TE CORPO-

12. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK , CO RPOR ATE LAW 401-61 (1 986) (discussing the dis·
tincti on between mergers and asset sa les and d esc ribing the respective differenc es in !eg:1 \
consequences).
13. The statute performs thi s functi o n bo th when two firm s of equa l size merge a nd when a
larger firm absorbs a smaller one.
14. See, e.g., Da. CoD E A;-J;--;. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991).
15. The Delaw a re Supreme Court, for examp le, has drawn precise ly this di s tincti o n: ·· ,6..
merger o rdinaril y contemp lates the continuance of the enterprise and of th e s tockh o idcr ·s in vest ·
ment th er ein, though in altered form; a sa le of all assets .. o rdinarily co ntemplat es th e liquid a·
tion of the enterpri se .
. Th ey are, in genera l. di stin c t an d designed for difre rent end s. ·· Sterlin g
v. Mayfl o wer Hotel Corp .. 93 A.2d 107 , 112 (Del. 195 2).
16. Suppose, for exa mpl e, th a t th e se ll e r's a sse ts incl ud e a large pi ece of und eve lop•::cl real
estate which the seller"s sh3reh o lders value at S2 million. but which the buyer only values at :1 l
milli on. If the se ll e r retain s th e real est:lte, the parti es hav e an addi tion a l $ 1 milli o n gain fro m
trade to divide. In :.uc h a case, it may be cheaper to s trt!ctur e th e transac tion as an asse t salethat is, a sa le of assers other than th e rea l est:lte - ra t her th a n as a mer ge r follo wed by a s::d e of
the real es tate back to the se llers . Similarly , if the se ll e r has a liability which it valu es a t minus$ i
million , while th e buye r believes that it is likely to cost the firm $2 milli on, the parti es will again
jointly maximize gains by st ructuring the transaction as an asset sa le. leav in g the liability with
th e selle r whi le tr a nsfe rring eve r ythin g d se to the buyer. S ee generally D ,\LE A. O ESTE HL E.
THE LAW OF MER GE RS, ACQU ISITI OI'S. AND REORG ANIZ.\TI ONS 155-5 6 (1991).
17 . See infra te xt followin g note 22.

November 1993 )

Successorsh ip

207

parties to allocate assets and liabili ties to the highest valuing user.
The value of appropriate and predictable transactional forms for
common transactions bea rs emphasis. Altho ugh in theory one oft en
can, wi th sufficient paperwork, use an asset sale to replicate a merger,
the difficulties and costs can be signi ficant. Securing th e consent of
third parties to an assignment of a lease or a license provides a n opportunity for those parties to wit hhold consent. By contrast, a statutory
merger leaves all such agreements in effect as a matter of law, absent
contractual commitments to the contrary.
'While the legai distinctio n between mergers and asset sales is a
valuable one, it provides its own opportunities for abuse. Often th e
choice of transactional form will be driven by tax considerations at best only marginally related to minimizing transaction costs or allocating assets to the highest valuing user. Tax law accordingly seeks to
d istinguish between economically and tax-driven corporate
reorganizations . 18
M ore relevant for our purposes is a second motivation. All state
corporation codes provide for the dissolution of corporations. Traditionally, state cod es have permitted corporations to dissolve and pay
out surplus to shareholders after pay ing off all known creditors. New
York's Business Corporation Law, for example, provides for a corporation's voluntary dissolu tion upon authorization by shareholders. 19
A fter dissolution, the corporation winds up its affairs, paying off its
creditors and distributing an y surplus to shareholders .20 New York 's
statute, like most t raditional corporate law statutes, bars claims of
creditors who come forward after the statutorily mandated notice and
claims period.21 As to known creditors, thi s system is satisfactory so
long as it prevents fraudu lent conveyances.22 If the asset seller re18. See genera /!y B OR IS l. BITT KER & J . \ ~IES S. EUSTI CE, FEDERAl. l NC O~I E T AXATI0'-1 OF
ch. 14 (5th ed. 198 7); 2 MARTIN GINSB U RG & JA CK
LEVIN. M ER GERS, ACQUISITIONS. AND LEV ERAGE D B UYOUTS~ ~ 609 ( 1993).

CORPO RATIO NS AND S H,\R E HOLD ERS

19. N.Y. Bus. Co RP . L.>.w § lOOi (McKinn ey 19 86).
20. N.Y. Bus. CORP LAW§ 1005 (ivfcKin ney 1986).
21. In particular. th e statute prov id es :
(a) A t a nyt ime afte r d issol uti on, the co rpo ra ti o n may give a notice req uirin g all c redi to rs
and claim an ts. inci ud ing any wi th unliquidated o r contingen t claim s a nd a ny with whom the
corpo ration has unful filled co nt racts, to present their cla im s in writing and in detail a t a
specified place and by a specified day , which shall not be less than six mo nth s after the fir st
publ icatio n of such notice.
(b) ... [C)lai ms '-> hi c h are not ti me ly fikd as prov ided in such no ti ce except claims which
"-re the subjec t of li tigation on til e date of th e first pu bli ca tion of such notic e ... shall be
foreve r barred as again st the corpomtion, it s assets, directo rs, officers and sha rehold ers.
excep t to such extent. if an y. as th e co urt ma y al low them again st any remaining asset s of
the corpora ti o n in the case of;: credi to r wh o s hows sa ti sfacto ry reaso n for hi s failur e to fi le
his claim as so pro vid ed.
N .Y. Bus. CORP. Lw; § 1007 (McKin ney 1936).

22. Fo r examples of the pro tection aga inst fraudu lent co nveyanc e, see the UCC' s bulk trans -
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ceJVes fair value for the assets, existing creditors of the seller are no
worse off and, when the seller dissolves, have an opportunity to present their claims for payment ahead of any distributions to
shareholders.
But this statutory structure provides an opport unity for asset buy·,:;rs and sellers to share the gcins of jointly exte rnalizing risk on.to 1Jn knmvn future tort cred irms - that is , " long-tail tort claimants."
Suppose, for example, t hat Firm X makes widgets that tend to explode
after twenty years. If Firm X continues, it will be liable for the damages the exploding widgets cause . BuL suppose that Firm Y buys only
the assets of Firm X, and t hen Firm X dissolves after paying all current and contingent creditors. Under the traditional corporate law
framework, when the widgets begin to explode twenty years later, the
victims will be without recourse. If the victims were to sue Firm Y,
Firm Y wou ld argue that it acquired only the assets of Firm X, not the
liabilities, and is therefore not liab le. If the victims were to sue Firm
X , they would find that Firm X no longer exists; even if the victims
could trace the former shareholders of X, the shareholders would argue that the law governing the d issolution of corporations bars the
claims. Such externalization is obviously inefficient: because of asymmetric information, the future victims cannot negotiate an appro priate
price to bear the risk of explosion, and widget manufacturers therefore
will not internalize the full costs of widgets.
One solution to this problem would be to eliminate the distinction
between mergers and asset sales with respect to liability, either in general or with respect to unknown claimants, by adopting a rule that
asset buyers and sellers are jointly and severa11y res ponsible for all or all contingent or all future- liabilities of the seller. A broad-scale
eliminat io n of the distinction between mergers and asset sales would
eliminate exkrnalization, but at the cost of interfering with the efficient allocation of assets and liabilities.
The traditional legal response has attacked t he problem from this
d irection, but in a modest form. The traditional exceptions to t he noliabi lity rule have imposed li ability on the asset purchaser when: (a)
th•.: purchaser expressl y or implicitly agrees to assume some or all of
the liabilities of the seller; (b) the asset sale resu lts in a "de facto
merger" of the selling corporation with or into t he purchasing corporation ; (c) the purchasing corpor2.tion is a "mere continuation" of the
selling corporation; or (d) the transac tion amounts to a fraud on the
fer provisions, U.C.C. §§ 6-101 to 6-111 (1978), and the U~IF. FR.·\UDULE~T CONVEY.-\~CE
ACT (1935).
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creditors. 23
More recently, in response to the problem posed by 1ong-tail claimants and the perceived inadequacy of the traditionai exceptions, some
co urts have ex panded corporate successor iiability in a number of directions.24 T he most prominent extensions ha ve been the "prod uct
line" 25 and the "con ti nuity of enterprise'' e xc ep ~ions. 26 Under the
product-line exception , an asset purchaser bea rs liability for injuries
caused by the predecessor's products when it continues to manufacture the same line of products under the same name and ho lds itself
out to potential customers as the same enterp rise .27 The contin uity-ofen terprise doctrine represents an expansion of the traditional de facto
merger exception. While the de facto merger exception req uires that
the assets be so ld for stock because such a transaction is the functional
equivalent of a statutory merger, the continuity-of-enterprise exception dispenses with that requirement on the grounds that sales for
stock and sales for cash should receive equal treat ment.
A second, more rece nt approac h has focused directly on the asset
seller by modifying the dissolutinn provisions to provide greater protection for long-tail tort claimants. T hus, th e Revised M odel Business
Corporation Act extended the claim period to five years on the assumption that most of the long-tai l claims wo uld arise during that
23. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 80 2 F.2d 75. 78 (3d Cir. 19 86 ); 15 FLETCHER, supra note 11,
succes~orsh ip law, see Howard Shect e r. Successor Liabili£y in Asse£ Acquisilions, in ACQUI RI NG OR SEL.Lil"G THE PR IVATELY HELD CO:OV!PANY 1992 ,
at 42 1 (PLI Corpo rate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 775 , 1992).

§§ 7122-7123.05. For a recent survey of

24. For important di sc ussio ns of successorshi p liabi lit y in thl' produc t li ability co ntext, see
Mark J. R oe, 1'vfergers. Acquisi1ions and Ton: .-i Com men£ on 1he Problem of Successorship Corpora lion Liabili1y, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984); A lan Sc hw artz . Producls Liabilily, Corpora/e Slruclure and Bankrup1cy: Toxic Subslances and £/z e R emole Risk Relauonship. 14 J. LEG AL STUD.
689, 715-18 ( 1985). In additi o n to the excepti o n s discussed in the tnt, a federal commo n law of
s uccessorship liability und e r CE RCLA and other env ironm e ntal s tatu tes has d eve loped. For an
eco nomi c anal ys is of successorship li abil it y un de r CERCLA, a nd a c itat ion to th e relevant cases,
see Merrit B. Fo x, Corporale Successors Under SlriCI Liabili1y: .·1 General Economic Theory and
1he Case of CERCLA . 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183 (1991) . A discus sio n of CERCLA is
beyond th e scope of this article.
25. R;,;y v. A lad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977 ); R3mirez v·. Arnsted Indu s., Inc., 431 A.2d
8 11 (N.J. 1 9~ 1 )
26. Turn e r v. Bituminous Cas ualty Co .. 244 N .W.2d 8 73 (Mi c h. 1976): see also A ndrews v.
J o hn E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 78! (Ala. 19 79 ). But see t he following cases rejecting th e
"co ntinuit y of enterp rise" excep tion: Nisse n Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2cl 56-1- (Md. 199 1); Niccum
v. Hydra Tool Corp .. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Min n. 1989); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co. , 320
N.W.2d 4 81 (Neb. 1982): Sc humacher v. Richards Shear Co .. 451 N.E.2d 19 5 (N.Y. 19 83);
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrome ta l Prods., In c .. 347 N.W.2d ll X (N .D. 198 4): Os t rows ki v. H yd raTool Corp., 479 A.2 d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v·. Am sted Indus, In c., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 19 8 5).
See also Hamak e r v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach, In c , 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 19 86 ) (d ec lining to
apply th e doctrine on th e facts of the case).
27. Scl' cases cited supra no te 25. Gen e rally. even th ose co urts that apply the product-line
exception will not do so if th e asset seller still e xi sts. Co nway v·. Wh ite Tru c ks. 88 5 F.2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1989).
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period. 28
Delaware has taken a different and more innovative ap1:oroach. 29
Like the trad itional approach. section 281 (b) of t h e Dda·wa:-e General
Corporate Laws requires that a dissolving corporation make provision
t o pay all contingent, concEtional, or unr:natured, corrtract tt2J ciairi1S
f.:/iCFr)lz to tl1e corporation -- the trad itio na l ru le.
281
a lso
requires, ho\vever, that a dissolving corpor<:Hion
make such provision as V>'ill be reasonably likely to be suffici::.:n:. to pw·
vide compensation for claims that have not been made know:~, or that
have not arisen , but that, based on facts knmvn to the corporation ...
are likeiy to arise or to become known ... prior to the expirat ior:t of an
app licable statute of limitation. 30

Section 281 (b) thus requires the d issolving corporation to make:: provision for long-tail claimants.
Proceeding directly under section 281(b), however, poses substan tial risks to the directors and shareholders of the dissolving cor poration because the question whether or not sufficient provisi o n for future
ciaims has been made will inevitab ly be litigable and judged at least
partly by hindsight. To reduce this risk, Delaware provides an innovative safe harbor procedure for complying with the mandate of section
281(b). Under section 280, the mandate of section 28 l(b) is met when,
after notice and a number of other steps, the Chancery Court determines (1) "the amount and form of security that will be sufficient to
provide compensation to a n y claimant who h as rejected the [Corporation's] offer for security"; 31 and (2) " the amount and form of security
which will be reasonably likely to be sufficient to provide compensation for cl aims that have not been made known . . . or that have not
arisen but ... are likely to arise or to beco m e k nown ... prior to the
expiration of applicable statutes of limitation." ~ 2
Once the corporation has posted the security required by the
C hancery Court an d paid other claims determined to be ovied, it may
distribute any remaining assets to the shareholders. u Under t hese circumstances, shareholders will have no liabili ty for any claims begun
after the t hree-year winding up period established by section 278 .
28. REVISED MODEL BUSlNESci CORP. ACT § 14.07 & crnt. (ABA Comm. o n Corporate
Laws \934) (amended 1991). The RiviBCA thus leaves claimant s ·. vhose cbims do not arise
\\'ithin the five-year period without any protection beyond the con1n1on law exceptions.
29. In the discussion that follows. we largely follow Chancell o r Allen's rath- breaking and
penetrating discussion in In re Rego Company, No. CIV.A. i 165 l. 1992 WL 302304 (Del. Ch.

Oct. i6, 1992).
~~

30.

DEL. CODE A.NIS. tit. o0 ,

31

!JEL. CODE .D._Nl\. tit. 8. § 2W(c)(J) (1974) (emphasis added) .

32 . DEL CODE
33.

DEL.

.~ NN.

·'

28l(b) (1974).

tit. 8, § 280(c)(2) (1974) (emph;;sis added).

CODE AN N. tit. 8 § 282 ( 1974).
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The Delaware procedure thus provides a mechanism for protecting
long-tail claimants w hile preserving both the repose offe red by the
tradit ional corporate law statutes and the useful legal disti nction between mergers and asset sales. To the exten t that the proced ure forces
corporations w m a ke provisions for long-tail claimants, i'>. thereby
bloc ks the 2-tternpt to impose 1isk on future victi:rns w..-vltho·u1: :.::c fr:pen s<::.·tion 1."\}hil:: rni n.;ln1i zing interference Vi ith the ah~nB.tion of c o :~_i.:·orat e
Both of the corporate law strategies focu s prirnarily O<l the asset
se!ier and the problems posed for claimants after the asset seller has
disappeared. M odifications of the dissolution sUltutes address the
problem faced by long-tail tort claimants directl y. By limiting a corporation's ab ility to d issolve and cut off futu re claims, these modifi cations help preserve long-tail tort claimants' priority over sh arehold ers
in t he d istribution of the old firm's assets.
By contrast, both the old and the new exceptions to the genera.l
rule of no liability on asset purchasers take an indirect approach . By
imposi ng liability on the asset purchaser, the law attempts to use the
typic a ily blameless asset purchaser as a cond uit to impose the cost of
r isk on t he original manufacturer. 34 If the asset purchaser knov1s that
it will be responsible for future harm caused by the asset seller's products, the purchaser will internalize those costs by paying a lower price
for the assets. 3 5
Corporate law successorship doctrine can t h us be summarized in
the fo1l ov;in g two-by-tvvo matrix:
TAX ONOM Y OF CORPORATE LAW SUCCESSOHSHl? DOCTRIN!C:
Merge r/S tock Sale

Sa le of Asse ts

K.n0\\' 11 Cia irr1ants

( I ) AtiiOf!l a tic liability
for ail obli ga ti ons of
old l'irm.

(3) Liability for s~ ll er"s oblip.tion s only if
express ly o r im plicitly o.ssu med .

U;1known Clain1ants

(2) A u to mat ic liability
for a il obli ga ti ons of
old firm .

(4) L iabi lit y }~]r s:.:lkr's cb:igutions u nd er
excepti ons to gene r ~\ rule, for example ,
express or impli cit ac; su:np tio n, de facto
n1ergei, rnen~ C\Jntinuat ion, fraud . product
iine co ntinuit y.

As the previous discuss ion demonstrates, the m erger-asset sal e distinction in corporate
law is a jormaf disti nction that co rresoonds
to
.
.
teed d ifierences in t he nature and costs of transacti ons . A.t the same
34. See M ichae! D. Gree n, Successor Liability: The Superiorilr o/Staturuty !?cjc/i'!.'! ro Proteu
Producrs L iability C/a im anrs, 72 CoRNELL L. RE v. \7. 28, 40 (1986).

35. !d.
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time, the distinc tion between mergers and asset sales for liability purposes provides an opportun ity for socially unproductive strategic behavior, behavior that the courts and legislatures have at te mpted to
p1evenz without losi ng t he benefits of the original distinction. As we
will demonstrate, both of these feat ures characterize the an a logous dis-

II.

SUCCESSORSH ! P IN LABOR LAW:

A T AXON0?-.1Y

Labor law and corporate law gi ve different m eanings to the te rm
successor. In corporate law, successor refers to t~e surviving firm tha t
acquires control of the firm either through a sale of stock, a m erger, or
a sale of assets. In labor law, the term successor is generally limited to
the asset purchaser who hires a sufficient number of the old firm 's
wor kers to con stitute a maj ority of the new labor force. 36 That courts
and commentators often use the term as a legal conclu sion rather than
as a descripti ve category further complicates matters. Because of
these different uses of the term, we wi ll try generally to avoid it and
use m ore specific and descriptive categories.
The same two-by-two matrix that organizes the corpo rate law successo rs hip doctrines provides a basis for organizing the multifarious
elements of labor law·s uccessorship doctrine. In this Part, we provide
a taxonomy of the main principles of the law, while ack no wledginglargely in footnotes - t hose cases that depart from the general rule.
Labor law cases, wi th only a few exceptions, are consistent with the
ta xonomy . Th is co nsistency m ay surprise labor law sc holars. T he labor :lavv cases freq uently mention that they are elevating substance
over form , and that the corporate form of the transaction is immaterial. ln fact, however, one can predict the outcome of a ll but a fe\v
cases by the corporate form of the transaction.
L~bor law, like corporate law, incorporates a fundamental d istinction bet,,veen m ergers and asset sales. In addition , the labor law successorsh ip cases present a third category absent from the corporate
cases: the sh ift of \vork case. T he paradigm for this t hi rd category is
JVLRB v. Burns I nternational S ecurity Services. 37 I n that case, the
36. Esmark, Inc. v. NL RB, 887 f.2d 739 (7th C ir. 1989 ), discusses th e d itT·.:renc es a t length.
Th e dec is io n m akes cl ea r that th e surviving fi rm in a stoc k sale is not co nside red a " s uccessor"
un de r labo r la w: " T he successors hi p d oc trine is sim ply in a pplicable to a stock sal e tn1nsac ti o n .... 'The stock sa le invo lves no brea k o r hi atus betwee n two lega l entiti es. but is . ra th er. the
•:ont inuing ex istence of a legal ent it y, a lbe it und er new o wnership. '" 88 7 F .2d at 75 1 (quot ing
TKB Int i. Corp., 240 N .L.R .B. 10 82, 1083 n.4 (1 979)). Instead, "(t)h e s uccessorship doc trin e is
limi ted to situati ons in wh ich the predecess or and successo r are unrelat ed entiti es a nd the new
employer do es nor ass um e the contrac tual o bligati o ns of the prior empl oye r. 887 F.2J a t 750.
37 406 U .S. 272 ( 1972 ).
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Sup reme Court imposed a duty to bargain on Bu rns when , after displacing its competitor vlfackenhut in a security contr act with Lod >
heed, Burns hi red m an y of the W acken hut employees bu t d id not bu y
any assets fro m or m erge 'Nith 'vVackenhut.
T he second major distinction in la bor law is the dis ti nction b ::>
"l \\'een rig hts d erivir1g fr o:m a c:oliective bargaini n g a g r e em err:~ {c ·.E}/\)
.-..,.-,
.---1 -i rr 1ri''- C ri c. .,....~~,~'l'""'tr; f...-n~ 'l"hc: NT
. . t ~ tl na] .iLI
l (.1
.... h
, ..- R
' e !L·0. .. t 1'o·,a.:;, i'"A'l._ r-v ~~ ( 'l>.., T"f
-~~· :\ \
.i ;. \...1. i ... Q l.:. L:J u C.:i .!. \ 1.:Jc:, .1..:. iJ~ii. •. lP_:
Q.!.J.J u
V U l
i . L...- .~1-,• .!-.'-/ ·
Q•

ro

? m c.durall y; part ies litigate claim s arising o ut of the CB A. un ck:r se2
tion 301 o f t he L abm Managem ent Relations A c t (LMRA ), :." ususll y
in a p roceedi ng in w hich an a rbitra tor interp rets t he C BA. P a rties
litigate clai ms deriving fr om t he N LRA as unfai r labo r p ractice
claims; the N at ional Labor Relations Board adjud ica tes those claims,
subj ect to a p pellate r eview. Substa ntively, t he disti ncti on bet·..ve~ n
righ ts un der the CBA and rights under the N L RA trac ks other com m on and im portant d isti nctions : between cases t hat a rise d uring the
term of a CBA an d th ose th at a rise after it has ex pired ; 39 an d bet ween
cases that in terpret th e o utcome of the ba rgaining p rocess a nd cases
invol ving the bargaining process itself. L abor law successo rsh ip d octrine, like th e analogous corporate law doctrine, can usefully be categorized and clarified in a matrix incorporating these distinctio ns :

38. Lc.bor ivia na gern e nt Re la t io ns (Taft -Hart ley), Pu b. L. No. 80 - 10 I, A c t § 30 i. 6 1 St;l t.
136 , 15 6 (codi fied a t 29 U .S.C § 185 ( 1988 )).
39 . Cases also can a ri se in a cont ext in w h ic h a ba rga inin g un it ha s bee n c ~ rt ifi ccl hut no
ag reement ha s bee n re ac hed o n a n in iti a l co ntrac t.
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T AXONOMY O F LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP DOCT R INE

CBA Claims

Merger/Stoc k Sale

Sale of A ssets

Shift of Work

(I) Obligatio ns und er
the CB A au to mati ca ll y
carry over; survivin g
firm stand s in th e shoes

(3) A sset p urchase r
o nl y assu m es s pec ifie d
o blig:J.t; o ns. The CB A
on ly· C!rri cs fonv ard

(5) B u ms -t y pe su ccesso r not ob li gated und er
pre dc>: c:S:<l r's CI3 A,

of th e di s~ppea r i r: g

v.·hc: n tht: asse t pur chaser e.\plicit ly or
co nstru ct ivel y ad o pts it.
Substanti a l continuit y
provides signific::mt but
rebutt ab le eviden ce o f
co nstructive adopti on .
Princ ip al case: H oward
Johnson .

p;:d

firm. Principa l cases :
Wiley;
W iley ! Inrer.\cicnce
labo r arbitration aw a rd.

unle:;;:~ J.dnptcd.
ca:~e:

P ri nci-

5u:"'t1S.

********************
?''-TLR.t-\ Ciai ms

(2) Obli ga tio ns und e r
NLRA automatically
carry over, both with
res pec t to the pres umption of continued
maj o rity support and
the duty to bargain.
Principal cases:
Esmark; Spencer Foods;
Miami Foundry; TKB.

A.

(4) Th e p res umpti o n of
co ntinued majority support and th e duty to
ba rgain ca rry o ve r
wh en more than 50%
o f asset purchaser's
bargainin g unit e mp lo yees work ed for sell er.
Principal cases: Fall
River; Gold en Srare;
Piusburgh and Lake
Erie R. R. Co. v. R ailway L abor Executi ves
A ssn.

(6) Th e p resumption of
co ntinu ed maj o rity suppa n and the duty to
bargain ca rr y fo rward
to the Bums-type successor wh e n m o re than
SO % o f its empl o yees
worked for the old
firm. Principal case:
Bunzs.

Preliminaries

Two elements play important roles in the labor law successo rship
doctrines: the " duty to bargain" and the concept of " substanti al contin uity." Because of their importance, we pause at this point to disc uss them in greater detaiL

1.

The Duty To Bargain

The duty to bargain plays a central role in the NLR A system.
Under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer or a union " to refuse to bargain co llectively." .. 0 Section 8(d)
defines collecti ve bargaining as " the performance of the mutua} obliga40. Llbo r M ana ge ment R ela tion s (Wa gne r) A ct , Pub. L. No. 80 - 10 l , 6 1 St at. 13 6, 141
(cod ifie d a t 29 U S. C. §§ l5 8(a)(5), 1SS(b)(.3) ( 1988 )).

Su ccessorship

2 15

tion of the employer and the representative of the emplc•yees to meet
at r•.:asonable times and confer in good faith -..v ith :ccspt::o:::t to VtiD.ges,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employm en t ." 41 '0/hile the
parties have an obligation to meet and confer in good fHi th , t h at obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposa l or require
the n12tking of a concession. " 4 2
·-r hese vague but cri ti ca l lTlandates have gi ven ;-ist: ·~ o a n e~·~ t e nsi·v·e
and complex jurisprudence.4 3 On t he one hand, the Board an d the
courts have elaborated on the duty to m eet, confer, an d negotiate:, as
'Nell as on the obligation to deal in good fai th. O n th.:: ot h~ r hand, they
h ave limited the applicability of the duty to bargain to so-called
"mandatory topics," specifically- drawing on the language of section
8(d) - "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. " For most other topics, bargaining is permissive, r.ot
mandatory. 44
T he duty to bargain is critical for three reasons in the successorshi p context. F irst, it establishes or r eestablish es a bargaining re lationshi p between the employer and the union. Without it, the union has to
engage in an organizing drive, which is typically ve ry costly an d has
an uncertain outcome. Second, when the duty to bargain app lies, the
employer must bargain with the union over mandatory topics, riski ng
an economic strike if a contract cannot be signed. :Moreover, the new
employer may be unable to institute changes uni1atera1ly in mandatory
topics wi thout first bargaining to impasse.
Third, the duty to bargain forces the parties to disclose info rmati on in certain defined contexts. When, for example, an em ployer
claims that it is financially unable to meet the un ion 's d emands, it
must corroborate such claims on req uest. 4 5 Indeed , an .-:;mployer's refusal to supply such in formation may convert an economic st ri ke into
an unfair labor practice strike. 46 T he duty to bargain thus provides
the un ion with a low transaction cost mech anism for reestablishing
with the new employer the employee protections th at it had ach ieved
with the old employer.
'While serv ing these goals, however, the duty to bargain creates its

u.s.c.

§ l5 8(d) (1988).
§ 158(d) (19 88).
43 . See generally I T HE OEYELOI'ING L ABO R L\ w. supra not e 1. ch . 13.
44. O n the distinction between mand a to ry and pe rm iss ive w pics, see id. c h. 16: se.! also First
Nat!. Ma in tena nce Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 ( 19 8 1): Fibr·:bo~rd Paper P rod s. Corr. v.
N LRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); N LRB v. Borg,Warne r C o rp., 35 6 U.S. 34 2 ( 19 53)
45. N LRB v. T ruitt M fg. Co. , 35 1 U.S. 149 (1956); Si oux C ity Stock ya rJ s. 293 N.L.R.B . I
(1 98 9): Accura te Die C as ting Co., 292 N. L. R.B. 284 ( 1989).
46. N L RB v. Jarm En ters, In c, 785 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 198 6).
41. 29

,J- 2. 29 U.S.C
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ov•m opportunities for strategic behavior. Because the employer may
r1ot rnake ur1ilateral chan_ges even during a strike before ~n eg-o ·t i ations
reach an impasse, the d uty to bargain provides a mechanisrn that skillfu l negotiators may use for d elay. By stringing out negotiations ··vith
a party
sequential rnin or concessions, anecdotal evidence suggests
~~ay del ay ir.n passe, ancl tl1ereby preserv~~ the stJ.t us
s.s

·t-._-,~, o years.·~~

T he issue relating to the d uty to bargain th at is central to rrwst of
th is article is the identification of the circumstances in wh ich ::he stock
purchaser or asset purchaser takes on a duty to bc.rgain w ith fne union
that previously represented the workers. vVhen those circumstances
exist, the 1aw of mandatory topics fixes the scope of th at duty .4 8
2.

Substantial Continuity

Critical to the differen t threads of the labor law successorship doctrines is the concept of substantial continuity. Substantial continuity
has two elements: continuity of operations and continuity of
workforce . The courts and the Board measure substantial con tinuity
of opera tions by whether the purchaser has " acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and continued, without interruption or substantial change, the predecessor's business operations. " 49 In measuring
47. The scope of the duty to bargain - that is, the determination of which topics are
mandatory- thus becomes critical. For an economic analysis of mandatory bargaining topics in
the relocation context, see Michael L. Wachter, The Rule Governing Relocation: The Economic
Logic of the Supreme Court Cases (Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
In developing the scope of mandatory topics, the Court has viewed the NLRA's mandate regarding " wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" as words of limitation.
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 220 (Stewart, J., concurring). Only topics that are "almost exclusively
'an aspect of the relationship" between employer and employee" are mandatory under all circumstances. Firs! Narionall\1ain1enance. 452 U.S. at 677 (quoting A llied Chern. & Alkali Wor!,ers v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co .• 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)). Issues involving questions of corporate
finance, product design, advertising, and the like are always nonmandatory. A third category of
issues - those that affect employment but also concern the "scope and direction of the enterprise'" - are subject to a balancing test that weighs the benefits and costs of making a subject
mandatory. Firs! Na rional lvfainlenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
48 . There is a related issue on which we will spend little time, nam ely, whether the old firm
has a duty to bargain with the union over an owner's decision to sell its stock or a tlrm's decision
to sell its assets. This question goes to the obligations of the old firm, as distinguished from our
focus on the obligations of the new firm.
Doctrinally, the answer is fairly clear. In general. the old firm has no obligation to bargain
over whether to sell the firm or its assets, but it does have an obligation to bargain over the effecis
of such a decision on the employees. Firs! Naiional Mainlenanc e. 452 U.S. at 677 n.l 5. On the
other hand, bargaining would be required if the union proposed increased employment security in
the form of a "successor and assigns'" clause during negotiations over a new contract when no
offer was outstanding. Because such a provision may give the union a right to an injunction
against a sale to a purchaser who does not agree to be bound by the old collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), see Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 4 17 U.S. 2~·9,
258 n.3 (1973), it can force a predecessor firm to bargain with th e union ~tbout a future sale of
stock or assets.
49. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973).
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substantial continuity of operations, the N LR B examin-es a. nurnber of
factors. These include :
whether the business of both employers is essentially th e sam ·e; wheth er
th e employees of the new company are doing the same jobs iD the same
w o rk ing co nditions under the same supervisors; and whether the new
entity has th e san1e prod ucti on process, p:rodtlces the ss_mf:
!J.ct::. , c.nd
basic a.lly has th e sank body of custo m ers. 50

Substant ial co n tin u ity of ~--io rkforce d epends on vvh8.t pto:q·:J rt~o~~ of t h ·::
ne..,v employer's wo rkforce v;as employed by the o1d employerY
In the labor econornics literature, the subst3. ntial continuity test
cl osely parallels the situations in which the internal labor rnar ket is
unchanged. 52 John Dunlop, and later Peter D etTinger and lVlichael
Piore, used these fac to rs to define the internal labor market of the fi.r m
as " an administrative unit ... within which the pricing and allocation
of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and proced ures." 5 3
Similarly, Mich ael W achter and Randall Wright rely on these factors
in defining the internal labor market as the long-term contractual relationship between a firm and its employees with match-specifi c in,;estments. 54 This link between substantial continuity and the internal
labor market is critical to understanding labor law successorship
doctrine.

B.
1.

Column 1: Mergers and Stock Sales

Box 1: Obligations Under the CBA After a JV!erger or Stock S ale

As in the corporate context, a merger or stock sale does not, by
itself, change any obligation under a CBA. The semi nal labor laYv successorship case, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 55 involved a
statutory merger. Interscience merged into 'Wi ley, and the much
larger Wiley workforce absorbed the Intersci ence em ployees. ~Nh e n
50. Fall River Dyeing & Fi ni shing Corp . v. NLRB, 4 82 U.S. 27. -\ 3 ( l n7)
5 I. A thres hol d qu es tion is whethe r the changes resulting fro m the ca pital m~rkct tra nsacti o n have a ffe c ted th e " ap prop riateness" of the bargainin g unit. in mak in g it s b::~ rgainin g .. unit
determination, the NLRB loo ks to a "communit y of interes t" am ong th e wo rke rs. T he fac to rs in
definin g a communit y of int erest include, for exampl e, th e similarit y in the m eth od of determining compensati on: th e similarity in benefits, hours, or other term s an d co nditi ons of ·~ mp l o y me n t;
a nd co mm o n super vision a nd determin a tion of labor-relatio ns po li cy. /\ RC HIB.-\LD Co x , D EREK
BOK, & ROBERT GUSMAN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 28 3 (10th ed . 19 86 ).
52. Fo r a di scussion of co ntinuit y of ope rati o ns, sec inf ra text accompanying no te 130.
53. PETER B. DOERING EK & M ICHAEL J. PIOR E, INT ERNAL L\ BOH :'i! .\R KETS .-\N D i\1. \N POW ER AKA LYSIS 1-2 ( 1971) (citing John T. Dunl o p, Job Va ca ncy Jfea.w ncs and Economic
Ana(ysis. in NAT!OJ'o: AL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH , TH E ME..\SU RE ME"i T .·\ND ! YI ERPR ET.-\TION OF JOB V.-\CAI"CIES: A CONI'ER E/'.'CE REPORT 27 ( 1966)).
S... Mi cha el L. Wachter & Ran dall D. Wright, Th e E conom ics of ln temal Labor Jfad<'iS, 29
l:..: D USTRI.·\ 1. R EL. 240 ( 1990).
55. 376 U.S. 543 (1 964).
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W iley refused to recognize the u nion as the bargainin g a gent of Inter 3Cience's ernployees, the unior1 brou ght an actio11 under sectiotl 301
th e LMRA to com pel arbi trat io n under the arbitration provision of
the collective bargaining agreement. 56 The union sought to req uir-::
\V iley to recognize righ ts of fonner I nterscience em p loyees 'Nh ich had
\'ested unde r the now-lapsed In ·t ersc ience CB.~ -- s peci flc ~d 1y ~ :cighi:s
i:o ~. ~nic:r it:yt "\lJ.CCttion pay, pension payrr1ents, and scvera:c·:e pay . 57
-~-:'-Vi1 ey argu ed that ' ~it .n ever V/as a party to the collective ba rgzin1ng
a gre:::ment, and that, in a ny even t, the U nion lost its status as represen't3tive of th e former Intersc ience employees wh en they were mingled
a. larger W iley unit of employees. " 58
T he Supreme Court held that the In terscience arbitration clause
bo und \Viley to arbitra te the em p loyees' claims und er t he 1nterscien ce
CBA, reasoning that, under state corporate law, the surviving corporation in a merger is generally liable for the obligations of the d isap··
peari ng fir m. 59 T he Court, how ever, refused to decide whether the
union lost its status as representative of the former I nterscience
employees .60
In th e subsequent arbitration, the arbitrator determined th a t, w hile
th e In terscience CBA initially continued in full force after the merger,
it was displaced once the intermingling rendered the C BA
inapp!ica ble. 61
T he logic of the Wiley rule th us follows the corpora te la w rule: the
survi ving firm or t he stock purchaser has no greater or lesser ob iiga·tion to abide by the CBA than the old firm. In eith er situatio n, a
chan ge of circumstances, sometimes initiated by the em ployer, rnay
render the CBA in appl icable. W hether there is substantial conti n uit y
in th e operations of the surviving firm provides evidence on t he quest ion whether the changes in the operations are so signi fic an t as to
rend er the CB A inapplicable. 62
56. 376 U.S. a t 54 ....~- 4 5.
7
57. 376 U .S. at 5'.J -.
58. 376 U .S. at 547 .

59. 376 U.S. a t 550 n.3. (n addi ti o n. the Court supported it s holding by refe rr ing to th e
feder ~l

po licy favoring a rb!t ra ti o n a nd th e extent to wh ich requi ring a rbi t ra tion \'.' ill

c a :_;t~

the

transiti on fo r c:rnpl oyees, thereby prom o ting labor peace . F or a discussi o n elf the proccJ ur~!
2:.s p(;ct s of Pliicy. see .4..1an Sch'.vart z, N o te, .Procedural Arbirrability Under Section 301 o_/ ih e
LMRA. 73 Y.\ LE LJ. 1459 (1964).
60. 376 U.S at 547 -48.
61
A rb.).

Int e rscien ce En cycloped ia, Inc. , 55 Lab. Arb. Re p. (BNA) 210. 21 8 (197 0) (Rob <:rts.

62. See. e.g. , 55 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 2 18. The Founh C irc uit has co nnnc nt ed:
A lth o ugh we find the co lkc ti ve bargaining a greement was binding [in th<: case ;H hand] .
we do no t ado pt a rule that labor agreem e nt s rem ain in force in every situ a ti o n wh ere cor porat e owne r~;hip change'; thro ugh a stock sa le. .
\Vh c rc the corpo rate form su r v i ve ~. o n iy i;1
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W iley was still obligated for all payments due its employees under
'Lhe CBi\ including -vaca·iion po.y accrued betyveen the date of tl1e
merger and the ap parently permissible displacement of the CBA , as
'Nell as job security, gri.evance, and seniority provisions du ring the
SrJ.me period. The arbitrator also held that W iley was obligated to contri t)lxte to t l~ e vve1fElrt :-:~nd i>::~n.slc'n funds under the Interscience C B. L1!.,
·b ut Iha·l t:h~:: i nL::rsciencc u:nion had s ~:tt ]ed tl1ose clain1s .
i\..1 thoug1-l the central issue in tt1 e case ·was one of contract enfo fcement , it bears im portant simi larities to the statutory issue of the dGty
to bargai n. The ~CB:\ cont in ues in efft~c t as long as sufficient con tinu ity exists to make the CBA applicable. A bargaining unit will remain intact after an asset or stock sale as iong as substantial continuity
exists bet'.veen the old fi rm 's and t he surviving firm 's workers. Subsequent cases have largely conformed to t his rule. 63
1

name, bu t a n ent ire ly new operatio n rep laces t he old , th e corpo ration might not be fa irly
term ed a " con ti nui ng "' empl oy er in any prac tica l sense.
EPE, !nc_ v_ NLRB . 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4 th C ir. i 98 8) . As prev iously disc ussed , we int er pret
thi s p rim a ril y to be a statement abou t the na tu re of the empl o yer' s obli gation un de r a CBA, no t a.
s tate m en t abo ut whether a merge r or sal e of stock changes those ob li ga ti o ns. Bot h before a nd
aft er a me rger or stock sa le, when " an entirely new operat io n replaces the old" th e o ld C DA is
inapplicable.
63 . In NL RB v. Rockwood E nergy & M ineral Cor p., 942 F .2d 169 ( 3d Cir. 19 91 ), H a rm ony
Minin g Co. sign ed a C BA effective thro ugh Sept ember, 198 4. In 1982, Harmony suspe nded
prod ucti o n beca use of financial di ffi cu lti es. REM CO, Harmony's maj o r credi to r, acquired con tro l by acqu irin g a ll of the Ha rmo ny stock and th en sough t to re pudiate all o b!i g:lli ons under the:
C BA . U lti mately, REiv!CO reo pened prod uct ion b ut unil a tera lly chan gc:d terms. T he Third
C irc uit held that , because REM C O acquired contro l through a stock sa le, it stood in Ha rmony\
sh oes and thus cou ld not un il ate oall y ch a nge terms of the C BA. Similarl y, in Esma rk, Inc. v.
NLRB, 887 F2d 739 (7 th Cir. ! 989), the Seven th C irc uit found tha t the C BA ag reement contin ued to ap ply follow in g tran sfer of a fi rm· s ow nership through a sa le of its stock . See also EPE.
l nc. v_ N LR B, 845 F2d 483 (4 th Cir. 1938) (h o ldin g that CBA rema in s in force a ft er stod: ;;ale):
G ene ra l T eamsters L oc al U nion No. 249 v_ Bili's T ru ck in g, In c., 493 F2d 956 (3d Cir . 197.-+)
(enforc ing CBA when only th e identity of stoc kholders a. nd co rpo rate name change): Phil lip
Wall & Sons, Inc., 237 N.LR.B. 11 61 ( 1988); Lauds F urniture Stores, In c .. 246 N.LR.B. 360
(1 979 ); T K B Int l Co rp., 240 N LR .B. 1082 ( 1979) (hol d ing that, when TKB acquired
Hendricks -M iller by a s tock tra ;1sfer, T!(B remained a membe r of th e multiemploycr bargaining
unit , with all th e assoc iat ed obliga tions. u ntil withdrawal pursuant to th e withdraw:!l r~quire 
m ents): Topinka\ Count ry House , lnc .. 235 N.LR.B . 72 (1978); Wes tern Boot & Shoe. Inc .. 205
N.LR .B. 999 ( 1973). B u1 ;~ ~ N LR B v. Edj o. l nc, 63\ F2d 604. 608 (9th Cir. 1980 ) (ho lding
that existing collecti ve barga.inin g agreeme nt does not bin d a stock pu rc haser, although ~; t oe~
purc haser also m ay not uni latera lly set initial term s) _ A pp arentl y neither par ty in Edjo ~r r guc d
th at th e stock pu rchaser was oblig:Jt ecl to abid e by the se ller 's CB A. 631 F.2d at 606 n.3. One of
the judges, howe,·e r, co ncurred in th e resu lt on thi s grou nd. 631 F.2d at 608 -09 (Blumenfeld. L
concurring).
I n M PE. Inc .. 226 N . LR.B. 5 19 (1976). the Board held that a stock purchaser. urW\\arc that
th e old man ~1gem e nt h:tci negotiated and ini ti::tled - bu t no t yet formally ex ec ut ed - a llC\\
CBA, was no t bound by it. H o-wever. th e Board did not d ete rmin e whethe r the old ernp!oyu.
hav in g initia led the ag ree me nt , would h av e bee n ob li gat ed to execut e it but for the sak_ The
Boa rd itself seems to recog!lize the ex tent to wh ic h :tiP£ depa rt s from th e general approach to
Box 1 cases. In a subsequen t case. the Board sough t to distinguish !'v!PE as " a sit uat ion wh ere
th e stock transfer occu rs at a ti nte whe n no con tr·act exists to be ass um ed, " without :rck nowledg in g that the part ies had n~gotiated and in itialed a CBA pri o r to the tran sfe r o f th e stock. 2-W
N.LR.B. at 1085.
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Box 2: Obligations Under the NLRA After a
!Merger or Stock Safe

I n contrast to Bo x 1 cases, which ty pically arise d urin g the term of
a CBA, most Box 2 cases a r ise w hen contro l of t he fi rm changes after
th e CBA has la psed or prio r to the signing of an ini t ial c o n tract. Beca use t here is no co ntinuing CBA~, no sec ti on 30 1 issues a ri se. In stea d,
Bo x 2 cases hin ge up on ·whet her th e surviv ing fi nn has a statuto ry
d uty to bargain with its workforce. A gain sho v.;in g t he parallels between corporate and labor law, the rules of Box 2 la rgely follow those
of Box 1. Labor law assumes that the firm resulti n g fro m a merger or
a stock sale retains its identity an d thus h as the sam e d uty to bargain
as the old firm . 64
This duty to bargain, however, continues only as long as the union
continues to represent the employees in the bargaining unit. In Box 2type cases, the duty to bargain in good faith is a presumptive rather
than absolute obligation. In the year following Board certification and
durin g the term of a CBA, the union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of continuing majority support; 65 subsequently that presumption
becomes rebuttable. 66 An employer may wi t hdraw recognition and
s top bargaining if it can establish either that the union no longer enjoys the support of a majority of t he bargaining unit employees or that
its refusal to bargain is b ased on a good faith, reasonable doubt of
continued majority support, b ased on objective considerations. 67 A
merger or stock sale does not disturb t hese presumptions. 68 The burden remains with the firm to rebut the pres umption of continued majority status.
T hus, in United Food & Commercial Workers Int ernational Union
v. NL RB 69 (Spenc er Foods), Land O' La kes acquired S pencer Foods by
acquiring all of its stock after the CBA had lapsed , the plants had been
shut down, and the workers had been lai d off. T h e D .C. C ircuit found
no substantial evidence in the record to support th e Board's conclu64. See United F ood & Comme rc ia l W o rk ers Inti. Un io n v. N LRB , 768 F.2 d 1463, 1470-71
(D. C. Cir. 1985).
65. Fall River D ye in g & Finishin g Co rp. v. N LR B, 482 U .S. 27 , 3 7- 39 ( 1987); NLRB v.
B urn s Inti. Sec. Servs., In c ., 406 U.S. 272,2 79 n.J ( 1972); Brooks v. N LRB. 34 8 U.S. 96 (1 9 54);
R ockwood Energy, 942 F.2d at 173; see also I THE DEV ELOPI:--JG LABOR LAw, supra no te I, at
572.
66. R ock wood E nergy, 942 F .2d a t 173.
67. Fall River, 48 2 U.S. at 41 n.8; N LRB v. Ph oe ni x Pipe & Tu be, L.P ., 9 55 F.2cl 852 , 857
(3d Cir. 1991); see also I THE DEVEL OPI NG L\B OR LAW . supra note I. a t 571 (citin g cases).
68. NLRB v. Edj o , Inc., 631 F.2d 604. 607 (9th C ir. 198 0) (holdin g that a change o f stock
own ership does not alt e r the presumpti o ns regardin g co ntinued maJ Ority s upport and duty to
barga in ).
69. 768 F.2d 1463 ( D .C. Cir. 1985).
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sion that the new Spencer Foods - that IS, the firm now owned by
Land O ' Lakes -justifiably r efused to bargain with the union, and t he
court remanded the case to the Board to fashion a remedy.
Spencer Foods ill ustrates the role t hat substantial continuity plays
in Box 2 cases - that is, cases in vo lving a successor firm' s duty to
bargain after a merge r or stoc k S2i le. Sub:rcantial conti n uity is irrelevant to whether the ol d firm's d uty to bargain carries forward to the
new firm or owners. Substantial continuity, however, is critical to determining whether the new firm can rebut the presumption of continued majority support that exists even after a CBA has expired. Lack
of substantial continuity can establish either lack of majority support
or a good faith and reasonable belief based on objective considerations
that the union no longer enjoys majority support in the relevant
bargaining unit. In Spencer Foods, the Court held that, given the substantial continuity that existed between the old and new firm s, the new
firm had not rebutted the presumption that the union enjoyed majority
support in the workforce, and therefore the firm was obligated to bargain collectively. The court's holding rested on the administrative law
judge's finding that the layoffs probably would be temporary, serving
to "effectuate a sale of an ongoing business enterprise to (Land
O'Lakes], i.e., a business which encompassed the resumed operations
of the Spencer plant by [Spencer Foods] albeit under new
ownership. " 70
C.

Column 2: Sale of Assets

Boxes 3 and 4 concern transactions between the old firm and the
surviving firm that involve a sale of assets. Recall that, under the corporate law rule, a purchaser of assets does not assume the claims of
known claimants in tort or contract unless specifically agreed. On the
other hand, with res pect to long-tail tort claimants, corporate law has
developed legal mechanisms to limit opportunistic behavior. The labor law cases follow the same pattern with a different spin.

70. 768 F.2d at !472 (qu o ting Spencer Foods. Inc. 26S N LR.B. 1483. 1509 (1984)). Bu t
for a contrasting case, see NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral C o rp .. 942 F.2d 169 (3d C ir.
199 1). In Rockwood En ergy, the court correc tly held that substantial continuity was irrelevant to
whether th e dut y to bargain re ma ined a fter a stoc k sale. H oweve r, the cou rt virtuall y ig no red
th e importance o f substantial co ntinuity to the determination whether the emp loy e r had carried
its b urd en o f es tabli shin g that th e union no lon ge r enjoyed m aj ority support after a fi ve -year
hiatus. S ee. e.g.. Miami Foundry C o rp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 19 82 ); Miller Truckin g
Sen·., In c., 176 N.LR.B. 556 (1969), enforce ment denied on other grounds. 445 F.2d 927 (lOth
Cir. 197 1).
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Box 3: Obligations Under the CBA After an Asset Safe

Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Jo int Executive Board 71 mvolved the obligations of the purchaser of assets under the seller's collective bargaining agreement. Originally, the Grissoms operated a
H owa rd Johnson franchise motel and adjacent r:staurant. The employees, represented by a union, had ente red im o a CBA vvith the
Grissoms containing an arbitration provision. Hov,;ard Johnson subsequently leased the premises, hiring only a few of the Grissom employees. The union brought an action against H owa.rd Johnson under
section 301 of the LMRA to enforce rights of employees not hired by
Howard Johnson. The Grissoms had agreed to arbitrate the extent of
their liability to the former employees under the CBA .72
The Court held that Howard Johnson was not obligated under the
CBA between the former employees and the Grissoms. 73 The Court
distin guished Wiley, on which the union principally relied, on the
grounds that Wiley had involved a merger; in contrast, Howard Johnson involved a sale of assets, after which the Grissoms - the initial
employers - remained a viable corporate entity against whom the
union could enforce any obligations under the CBA .74 Indeed, even
though the CBA with the Grissoms contained a "successors and assigns clause" - purporting to make the agreement binding on any
successors and assigns- the Court held th at the clause could not bind
a nonconsenting party but perhaps could have permitted the union to
enjoin the lease to Howard Johnson as a breach of the clause. 75
The rule of Howard Johnson, like the analogous corporate law rule,
is thus that, when a firm acquires assets, it does not assume the seller's
contractual obligations, specifically its collective bargaining agreement, unless it agrees to adopt it. 76 The Court noted that this rule \vas
consistent with federal labor law, which imposes no "official compulsion" to sign a contract or to adopt any specil'1c contractual terms. 77
As the primary justification for this rule, the Court invoked a corporate law goal of free capital mobility: "holding a ne\v employer bound
by the substantive terms of the pre-existing collective-bargaining
agreement might inhibit the free transfer of capital." 7 8 As a logical
71. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
72. 4 17 U.S. at 255.
73. 417 U.S. at 264-65.
74. 417 U.S. at 257.
75. 417 U.S. at 258 rd.
76. See also Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 4 82 U.S. 27 (1987).
77. Howard John son, 417 U.S. at 254.
78. 417 U.S. at 255 (explaining NLRB v. Burns Int i. Sec. Scrvs. , Inc .. 406 U.S. 272, 287-38
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of this reasoning, the Cou rt a lso reached the centra l ho lding
that Hmvard Johnson h ad no duty to hire the predecessor's
ernp loyees. 79

2.

_Q,..... .....

_1_/ U./\,.

A·
-r.

Obligations Under the N LRA Aft er an Asset S ale

Ju.st a:s Bo;{ 4 of the corporate 1a\v matr ix proves to be the ro ost
co mplicated and di ffic ult because of the po tential for strategic behavior, so too does Box 4 of th e labor law m atrix. The p ri ncipal Box 4
issue is '-:vhether an asset purchase r h as a d u ty to bargain with the
union that represen ted the employees of the se ller .80
In Fa ll R iver Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. N L RB, 8 1 the Suprem e
Court held th at, when substa ntial continui ty exists between the business of the asset seller and purchaser, the asset purchaser has a duty to
bargai n with th e seller's uni o n if "the maj ority of its employees were
em ployed by its predecessor. " 82 Beca use the successor has no dut y to
hi re th e predecessor's employees, however, the Court concluded that
triggerin g the duty to bargain "rests in the ha nds of the successor. " 83
The courts h ave made it clear that an asset purch aser cannot avo id
a duty to bar gain by discriminating against employees of the seller
because of their union status. 84 What counts as an tiunion animus in
the fail ure to hire employees of the asset seiler has been litiga ted extensively. 8 5 Critical fa ctors th at suggest antiunion animus include:
( 1972)). Beyond t hi s, th e Cou rt o ffers no a rgument fo r w hy it s hou ld not dee m a n asset purch aser to hav e consented to th e successo r a nd ass ig ns cbuse. By cont ras t, o ur an a lys is provi des
an exp lana ti on.
79. 4 17 US at 264.
80. A secondary iss u e is w h eth e r a n ass et purc haser is li ab le fo r th e asse t sell e r 's un fai r labo r
pract ices . T h e Sup re me Co urt held in Go lden Sta te Bo ttlin g Co . v. NL RB, 414 U .S. 16 8 (197 3),
that a purchas·:r who bo u gh t w ith k nowledge of the seller's unf;:,ir 13bor pract ices is jointl y and
sev e ra ll y liab le. Th is hol di ng d epa rt s fro m th e backgro u ~d co r po ra te law rule , un de r w h ic h th e
asset purc h aser is norm a ll y no t liabl e for t h e obligations of the sel ler. The co urt s s ubsequently
ha ve he ld that the ass et purc h ase r is li ab le when it h a d noti ce o f unfa ir labor practi ce c harg es by
the unio n , even thoug h forma l c harges had n ot bee n fi k d. NLRB v. Genera l W ood Prese r ving
Co., 905 F.2d 803 (4t h Ci r. ), cen. denied, 498 U.S. 10 16 (1990).

8 1. 4 82

u.s.

27 ( 1987).

82. 48 2. U. S. at 41. Fall River did n o t reso lv e th e am b igu it y in p r io r cases wit h respect to
w hether the dut y to bargain a ttach es if the asse t purchaser hires a majority of t h e se ll er 's repre sented e mployees but th ose e mpl oyees do no t cons tit ute a maj o r it y of t he e mp loyees of th e p u rchase r . 48 2 U.S. at 4 6 n.1 2 . Th e Board, supported by the co u rts of appea l, has h eld that
workfo rce co n t inu it y only exi s ts if a m ajo rity of the ass et purc h as er' s emp lo yees w e re e mpl oyed
by the se lle r . Saks & Co. v. NL RB , 634 F.2d 681 , 684-86 & n n.2-3 (2d C ir. 1980) (citing re levant
cases); S pruce l! p Co rp., 209 N. L.R .B. 194, 196 ( 1974), enforced. 529 F2d 5 16 (4 th C ir. 1975);
United Ma inten a nce & Mfg. Co., 21 4 N. L. R. B. 529 , 532 -34 ( 1974).

83. Fail River. 48 2 U .S. a t 41.
84. 482 US. a t 39 - 40; H owa rd Johnso n Co. v. Detro it Loc ;1 ! Jo int Exec u t ive Bd .. 417 U.S .
249, 262 n.S (1974); Elasti c Stop N ut v. N LR B, 9 21 F.2 d 1275 (D.C C ir . 1990).
85. See general ly the cases c ited in I THE D E VELO PJ :-;c; L .:,llOR. L \ W, supra note I, at 797
nn . 168 & 170 Un ite d Food & Comm e rc ia l W o rk ers Inti. Un io n v. N LRB . 768 F .2d 14 63, 1470-
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efforts by the new employer to discover from the old employer the
union sympathies of its employees, follo wed by a refusal to hire those
iden ti fied as sympathetic; hiring criteria with a disparate impact; and
an overall scheme designed to ensure that fewer than a majority of the
employees are union members. Factors in consistent \vith animus include unsu itability for new employer's operations and t!ni fc rmly appiied, valid business reasons for hiring a totally in~x pe ri en ced
wor kforce. I n aggrega te, these factors suggest that, if a ne\v employer
maintains the old operations intact, hiring new , inexperi em.:ed, nonunion employees in prefe rence to experienced , union employees indicates
an tiunion animus. 86 By contrast, if operations substantially are
changed so that experience in the old operation would be of little value
in the new operation, no such inference is warranted.
I n these cases, the critical issue is whether the union or the firm
has the burden of establishing majority support or its absence . In an
asset sale, when substantial continuity of operations and workforce exists , the firm must establish lack of support if it does not wish to bargain collectively. This obligation is precisely the same duty as the old
firm has after a CBA has lapsed. 87 When, on the other hand, there is
no substantial continuity in the workforce, the union has its normal
burden of establishing majority support before the firm has a duty to
bargain collectively. 88
Al though ma ny labor law scholars argue that successorship rules
pro vide scant protection to unions, Box 4 of our labor law taxonomy
sho ws that employees receive substantially greater protection than corporate law gives creditors generally. The fundamental goal of corporate law successorship doctrine, as noted above, 89 is to place creditors
in the same position vis-a-vis the successor as they were vis-a-vis the
predecessor with respect to their contractual entitlements. If creditors
7 1 (D. C. C ir. 19 8 5) [h e reinafter Spencer Foods] pro vid es o ne case in po int. In Spt'ncer Foods, the
cot:rt fo und a n asset purchase r to ha ve disc riminat ed aga in st th e uni o n w hen it adopted a hirin g
sta nda rd wh ich di squalifi ed man y former union me mbe rs fro m co nsider ati on for reemployment
but did not app ly th e stand a rd uniformly in compara bl e Situ a ti o ns. 768 F.2d at 1474 -76. By
way o f contrast, in Inland Co ntainer Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. 11 87 ( 19 33) . modified by 273 N .L.R.B.
1856 (1985); 274 N.L.R.B. 88 7 ( 1985); 275 N.L.R.B. 378 (19 8 5), Inland claimed that it refu sed
to hire the predecessor's workers because , having not been tra in ed in th e '· Inland Way," they had
formed ' ·bad habits." Wh en the record showed that Inlan d a ppli ed thi s rule in comparable situa·
tions , the Board found no antiunion animus. 267 N.L.R .B. at 11 90. Subseq uent evidenc e that
In la nd o nly hired appli ca nt s willing to work in a nonuni on en,·ironmen t, however, led the Board
to reverse this findin g. See 275 N.L.R.B. at 382-88.
86. See. e.g., Unit ed Stat es Marine Corp. v. N LRB , 944 F.2d 1305 . 1315·17 (7th Cir. 199 1) ,
cerr. denied, 112 S. C t. 1474 ( 1992 ); Spencer Foods. 768 F.2d a t P 74 · 76.
37 . See supra notes 64-70 and acco mpan ying te x t.
88 . See I THE DE VE LOPI NG LAilOH LAW , supra no te I. at 562 · 63.
89 . S ee supra tex t accompan yin g notes 12·16.
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are no worse off after a sale of assets than they were before, they have
no grounds for complaint. Thus, if a financi ally weak fi rrn sells all or
subs tantially all its assets for fair value, creditors are no worse off and
known creditors have no claim against the asset purchaser.
Labor law provides the corporate law protection of empl oyees as
cred itors so outine iy that courts and commentators have la rgel y ignored it. If the asset seller owes the employees wages, the empl oyee:>
can recover those v.rages from the seller. But, in striki ng con trast to
the corporate law successors hip doctrine with its focus on comrolling
behavior of the predecessor, labor law successorship doctrine also focuses on the behavior of the asset purchaser. Over and above the creditor protections afforded by corporate law successorship doctri ne and
other cred itor protective measures - for example, fraudulent conveyance and bulk transfer restrictions- labor law provides that, when an
asset purchaser maintains substantial continuity with the asset seller
by hiring a majority of the seller's employees, the asset purchaser has a
duty to bargain collectively. We will argue that the employees' distinctive relationship with the firm best explains this difference. 90
3.

Constructive Adoption of the CBA and Setting In itial Tenns
After an Asset Purchase

In dis tinguishing Howard Johnson from Wiley, the Co urt relied on
the form of the transaction, that is, on the fact that Howard Johnson
involved an asset sale rather than a merger. 9 1 The Court's re li ance on
this corpo ra te law distin ction supports our claim that the corporate
taxonomy provides a useful basis for a positive theory of labor law
successorship doctrine. Under this taxonomy, structuring a transaction as an asset sale rather than a merger results in different obligations in both corporate and labor law. To t hat extent , locati ng the
boundary betv;een Box 3 and Box 1 with respect to CBA. claims, and
between Box 4 and Box 2 with respect to the duty to bargain, becomes
critical. 92
The bo undary question most clearly arises when the asset purchaser hires all the sell er's workers to do the same work as they were
doing before. Had a merger occurred, Wiley makes it clear that the
old CBA wo uld fully bind the new firm. 93 In such circumstances , t he
new firm must continue the terms of the old CBA and, subsequently,
wi ll be obl igated to bargain over wages, hours, or terms and condition s
90 . See inf ra Part IV.

9 1. Ho ward Johnson Co. v. D e t roit Loca l J oint Executi ve Bd ., -1 17 U. S. 2-1 9. 256 (1974 ).
92 . F o r th e analogo us issu e in corpo rate law , see supra text accompan ying
93 . Jo hn W iley & Sons, Inc . v. L ivingstO n, 376 U.S. 543 . 551 ( 19 64).
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of employment to impasse before making unilateral changes. '\Nhen a
sale of assets occurs, by contrast, Howard J,_;hnson makes it clear that
the asset purchaser is not bound by the seller's CBA unless it agrees to
adopt it. 9 -+ Similarly, Fall River makes clea:t· that, when substantial
continuit y of ;,vorkforce and operqtions exists, the asset purchaser will
assun1e a ctu ty to bargain. 95
In th is boundary cas ~ j ilov:/e v:.:r ~ ".,vhe:n the asset purchaser hires aH
the old err1ployees to clothe sar11e "\vork as t .h~ y \V•.:re doing before, does
the CBA carry fonv ard to the lesser degree that the asset purchaser
must continue its terms whi ie bargai ning ove.:- any cha.nges from the
old CBA, a process that can drag out for a long time? A lthou gh this
situation provides the same general temptation to argue that "form "
should not be elevated over "substance," 9 6 the doctrine has pursued a
different path . In dictum in the Burns case, the Court suggested that
in some circumstances the old CBA v;ould carry fo rward in setting the
initial terms:
A lthough a successor employer is ordinaril y free to set initial term s on
which it will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be instances
in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of
the employees in th e unit an d in which it will be appropriate to have him
initially consult with the employees' bargaining represen tative before he
fixes terms. 97

The Court thus left open room for a limited exception to the general
rule that the predecessor's CBA does not bind the successor.
In the Spruce Up doctrine, 98 the Board has elaborated on the
94 417 U .S. 249, 262, 264-65.
95. Fail River Dy eing & Finishing Co rp. v. NLRB . 482 U.S. 27, 46 (1987).
96. Sec. e.g.. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F2d 38 (5th Cir. 19 67 ),
cert. denied. 389 U.S. 1042 (1968). In that case, U.S. Gypsum purchased all property and assets
of a United Cement p lant and continued ti1e operations unchang ~ d. Ini ti a lly, the Fifth Circuit
held th3t Gypsum was bound by the arbitrat ion provision of Un it ed Cemen t' s C BA, despite the
fact that it merely acqu ired the as~; ct s and tha t th e purchase agreement undertook to exclud e th e
CBA from th e purchase. 384 F.2d a t 4 I- -~4. The Fifth Circ uit rev isited t he question in a seco nd,

post -Burns opinion. There, the Fifth Circu it held

th ~L

desp ite Burns, the arbi trator \vas not

barred from orderin g that Gypsum com pl y with the terms o f th e U nited Ceme nt contrac t. The
cou rt rel ied heav il y o n the Sixth C ircui t' s op ini01: in the Ho ward Jo}u;son case, which imposed
the terms of the old employer CBA in a case in which the new emp loye r had not retai ned the o ld
employees . United Steelworkers v. United Stat es Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cen
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). F inally, in its third Ciyp.;um op ini on . the Fi fth Circuit held th at th e
Sup reme Court's reversa l of 1-loward Johnson did !lOt chang e its own conc lusion because, unlike
Howard Johnson, Gypsum in vo lved substantia! continu ity of the workforce. United Steelworke rs
v. Un it ed States Gypsum Co., 498 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.), cen. denied. 4 19 U.S. 998 (1974). The
F ifth C ircu it's ho ldin g is clearly no longer good law; Fali River made it clear that an asset purchaser who explic itl y reje c t:. the old CB;\ up front is not bound by it, no mat te r hovi much
contin uit y exists in the workfo rce.
97. N LR B v. Burns Inti. Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U S. 272, 294-95 (1 9 72).
9S. The doctrine is named afte r th e :eading Board deci sior:, Spruce Up Cor p., 209 N.LR.B.
194 ( 1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 5 16 (4th Cir. 1975). S ec gen erally l THE DEVE LOP I>IG LA BO R
L Aw. supra note I, at 3 i4 -16 . In Spruce Up. the new employer dispbced the old emplo ye r in th e
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Supreme Court's caveat, dd1ning the circumstance under wh1ch an 3.s~
set purchaser must bargain over initial terms . The scope of the Sp ru ce
Up doctrine is important in a nal yzing the success of our taxonom y. A
broad scope fo r the doctri ne w ould result in treating m any asset S~j ~'s
similarly to stock saies.
Consistent ~viTh t'~1 e corporcxte la>.v ap~)ro2.ch to the ob lig at i-o n ~~:
asse'l purchasers, ho "~;ev er , the doc trine restricts the Burns caveat ·~:-o
those situations in v-;hich an ag:reen1en t to continue the CBA can b~;
im plied. In parti cular, the caveat applies to (1) " circumstances
:;vhich the ne·;v employer has either actively or, by tacit inference, mis led employees into believing th ey wou id all be retained without change
in their wages, h ours, or conditions of employment"; or (2) " to ci rcumstances >vhere the new em ployer ... h as failed to clearly announce
its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former
employees to accept employment. " 99 The courts of appeals have
largely followed the Board' s Sp ru ce Up interpretation. 100
Spruce Up barber s ho p co ncess io n at Fort Bragg. Prior to taking over the co ncess io n, th e ne\<'
employer, Fo wl er, refu sed to recogni ze or ba rgain with the old un io n but to ld th e union rep resent a tives tha t " all th e barbers wh o a re work in g wi ll work... He al so informed them of the
co mmission rates he int ended to pa y, whic h were significa ntl y below what the barbe rs had been
earning fro m the previ o us con cession a ire. T he uni o n alleged th a t F owl er h ad committed unfair
labo r practi ces by refu sin g to bargain a nd by unilaterally c han ging the commi ss ion rates. U lt imately, m ore th an half of the b<! rbers in the new Sp ru ce Up shops had worked fo r th e o ld co n c,~s 
sion aire. 209 N.L.R.B. a t 194-95. T he ca:;e thu s presented the qu es tion of the scope of th e
Burns cavea t: l s th e new emp loyer who expresses a will ing ness o r an int en tio n to hire th e old
empl o yees free to set initial terms, o r mu st it abi de by th e old CBA unt il it nego ti ates a new
agree ment or barga in s to impasse?
99 . 209 N .L. R .B . at 19 5. As exampks of cases that fall within th e Bums caveat , the Boa rd
cited two p rior op ini ons "where the successor-•cmp lo ye rs, with o ut prior warning, unibt erally
changed the term s a nd con diti o ns of em p loy me nt p revail ing un de r th e p red ecessor after already
havin g committed them se lves to hire almo st a ll o f the o ld unit empl oyees with no noti ce tha t
th r.y wo ul d be expected to wo r k under new a nd differe nt ter ms." 209 N .L.R.B. a t 195 n.7 (cit in;s
Howard J ohnson Co ., 198 N.LR.B. 763 (1972), afl'd. . 49 6 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1974); Good Foods
M fg. & P rocessing Corp ., 200 N.L.R.B . 62 3 ( 19 72), ajjd.. 492 F.2 d 130 2 (7th Cir. 1974 )).
100. See, e.g.. I3mt her hood of R y. v. R EA Ex p ress, In c .. 52 3 F.2d 164 (2d C ir. ), ccrt. denied.
42 3 U.S. 1017 (1975). Th e cour t stat ed :
We read [the Burns ca veat] as bein g limi ted to th ose s itu at io ns whe re empl oyees a re ied a ;
the outse t by the suc cessor- em ploy er to believe tha t th ey will have contin uity of employm ent
on p re-ex istin g te rm s and as not <!pp lyin g where the new empl oy er di s pels any su ch im pressio n prior to or simul taneo usly with it s offe r to em ploy the predecesso r's wo rk force .
52 3 F. 2d at 171; see also U nited States M arine Co rp. v. l\JLR B. 944 F.2 d 1305, 1321-22 (7th C: ir.
1991) (ho ld ing that n~ w <:mpl oye r cannot crea ce e~ mbigui t y a bout its pla n ro hi re o ld employe'"·
throug h ill egal act ivity ), ceri. de nied. 1 12 S. C t. 14 74 ( 1992); Saks & C o. v. N LRB, 634 F.2 c! 68 !.
637 (2 d C ir. 1980) (Rnding that new emp loyer did not lead empl oye es to be li eve preexistin g term s
wou ld contin ue a nd was fre e to change ier ms) ; Bellingh a m Froze n F oods v. N LRB , 626 f .ld
67 4, 68 0 (9t h Cir. 19 80) (holding th a t new empl oye r wh o maint a in ed previous working co nditi c ns for a week after takeover co uld no t uni late ra ll y c ha nge terms), cerr. denied. 449 U .S. 112 5
(! 98 1); Na za reth Regi ona l H igh Sch. v. NLRB . 549 F.2d 873, 88 1 (2d Cir. 1977) (hold ing th at
new em pl oye r may fi x initial terms when it does no t explici tly state an int ention to hire o!d
employees on pree;( isti ng ter ms); Spitze r A kro n. In c. v. NLR B, 540 F. 2d 841 , 845 (6th Ci r. 197 6)
(h o ld ing th at new em p lo yer who hir es ali the ol d empl oyee:; a nd tell s them that the com pany
wo uld "carry on as us ua l" C<l nnot subsequ entl y in s tit ut e un ilatera l c ha nges), Ci'rl. denied. 42 9
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The Burns caveat, as dev eloped in the Board's Spru ce Up doctrine,
t hus imposes an obligation on a new employer to give advance notice if
it wants both to hi re the old employees and to set initial terms unilaterally. Otherwise, it runs the risk that t he Board or a court will find
th a t the new employer eit her impliedly ad opted the old CBA or
a d op ted the old CB,Ii, as th e initiai terms, c h a n g~s from which wi ll be
s ubject to a m a nda tory d uty to bargain. T h e q uestion whether the
new employer has manifested an inten t to be bou nd by the old C BA
will thus be a factual question in which s ubstanti a l continuity in operations
and
workforce
a.re
relevant
bu t
not
dispositive
101
considerations.

D.

Column 3: Shift of Work

Labor law's focu s on the behavior of the con tinuing firm yields a
th ird column that emanates from N LRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. 102 I n Burns, the old employer, Wackenhut, and the
new employer, Burns, had no contractual relationship. Burns d id not
merge with or purchase any assets from Wacken hut. Rather, Burns
d isplaced Wackenhut in a security contract with Lockheed by making
a lower bid. Subsequently, Burns hired many of Wackenhut's former
employees. The union that represented th e Wackenhut employees alleged that Burns both was bound b y the Wacken hut CBA and obligated to bargain collectively under the N LRA . The case thus squarely
raised the questions of the new employer's obligations in B ox 5 (under
the old employer's CBA) and Box 6 (und er the NLRA) .

1.

Box 5: Ob ligations Under the CBA After a S hift of Work

T he Su preme Co u rt held that Burns did not have a d uty to observe
the substanti ve cerms of t h e Wackenhut C BA, to which Burns had
never agreed. 103 Box 5 is thus essentially t:-te same as Box 3, which
concerns CBAs following a sale of asse ts: the CBA carries forward
on ly if t he new firm adopts it. 104 The Co urt d isting uished the Wiley
U .S. 1040 (1977); Zim's Foodline v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1142-44 (7th Cir.) (fin din g that new
employer who continues o ld terms fo r three weeks cannot mak e changes unilaterally), cert. denied. 419 US. 838 (1 974).
101. See. e.g., Unit ed Sta tes Can Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 1127 ( 1992) (holding that new empl oye r
adopted its predec essor's CI3A), enforcud. 984 F.2d 864 (7th C ir. 1993).
102. 406

u.s.

272 ( 1972).

l 03. 406 U.S. at 291.
104. S ee also A ut o M ech a nic s Local Lodge No. 11 0 1 v. N LRI3. 94 5 F.2d 408 (9th C ir. 199 1)
(o pini o n at N o. 90-70096, 199 1 WL 197005 (Oct. 3. 199 1)) (ho ld in g t ha t un io n ob li gat ed to
ba rga in with s uccesso r empl oyer); Boe in g Co. v. Int e rnati o na l A ss n. of Ma c hi n ists & Aeros pace
W orkers, 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974) (ho ldi:1g tha t lack of co ntinuit y o f wo rk force abso lves
new employer from duty to arbitrate under oicl emp lo ye r' s CIJ A ). ce rt. denied. 421 U.S 913
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case (Box 1) on the same corporate law grounds as it used in Howard
Jo hnson, namely, that Wiley in volved a merger occurring against a
bac kgro und of state law t hat provided that the surviving firm would be
liable for the disappeari ng firm's obiigations. 105
2.

Box 6: The Du ty To Bcug'lin Afte r a Shift of Work

With regard to the duty to bargain , the Bui?ZS Court went on to
hold that, because the un ion had been designated th e exclusive bargaining agent in a n election a few months before and the new employer had hired a majority of th e old ernployer's em ployees, the duty
to bargain carried forward. 106 Thus, Box 6 parallels Box 4, which
concerns the duty to bargain after a sale of assets: in each case, substantial continuity creates a rebu ttable presu m ption of continued majority support. 107 Whether the new firm must bargain over initial
terms is, as in Box 3, governed by the Spruce Up doctrine. 108 Box 6 is
a category completely absent fro m the corporate successorship doctrine and, like Box 4, gives substantial extra protection to employees
over that afforded creditors generally. 109

E.

The Failure of the Supreme Court To A dopt the Taxonomy

Neither courts nor lega l commentators have previously recognized
that the corporate law taxon omy carries over more or less intact to
labo r law. I ndeed, it is worth noting that cases are still litigated over
(1975). But see Systems Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 1 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990). Systems
i\lanagement held that, when antiunion animu s led to lack o f workforce continuity and refusal to
bargai n, the injured employees were entitled to back pay a t the old rate, although perhaps o nl y
until impasse would have been reached. It is unclear, howeve r, wh eth er the court assert ed that
the o ld CBA should have se t initi al terms or whether th e co urt beli eved that. had the old union
bee n bargaining, the emp loyer wo uld have bee n willing to pay the old rate.
105. Burns (Box 5) does not make clear w hether substanti a l co ntinuity in the workfo rce
c rea tes a rebuttable presum ption that the old CB A carries forward absent expli cit repudi a ti on.
Burns told th e ex-Wackenhut employees wh en hired th:lt Burns ··· cou ld not live with' th e ex is ting contract between Wac kenhut and the union." 406 U.S. at 275. The Court never addressed
th e question whether an exp licit rep udiation was necessa ry o r whether this con stitut ed an exp li c it
repudiation.
106. 406 U.S. at 27 8.
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. New Medico H ealt h Ca re Ct r , 95 1 F.2d 350 (6th C ir . 199 1) (opinion
at No. 91-5271, 1991 WL 2762 60 (Dec. 20. 1991)) (fi ndin g that duty to bargain ca rri es fo rward
when the successor hires virtually al l former employees), cert. denied. 112 S Ct. 2965 ( 1992):
A uto Mechanics Local Lodge No. 1101 v. NLRB, 945 F.2 d 408 (3d Cir. 19 9 1) (holding that
duty to ba rga in carri es forward wh en successo r rehires 11 of 13 former empl oyees); Systems
iWa nagement, 901 F.2d 297 (tlncling that. wh.: n a ntiuni on animus pre vent s th e dete rmin at io n of
w hether a majo rity of new empl oyees would have been former empl oyees of old firm, firm ha s a
duty to bargain).
108. S ee supra notes 98-101 a nd accompanying text.
109. As Ju stice R eh nquist not ed in d issent, Bums o ffe rs la bor claimants add ed prot ec ti on
o ver nonlabor claimants by divorc in g labor claims against a suc cess or from th e actu al assets the
successor acquires. Burns, 406 U.S. at 305.
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whether Colu mn 1 (mergers and stock purchases) or Column 2 (sale of
ass.cts) rules apply, with nnns attempting to h.ave Colurnn 2 rules applied to stock purchases, and unions attempting to have Column 1
r ules applied to asset purchases. li O T h e source of the confusio n partly
,:Jerives fro rn the ~~vol u t i on of the Suprem e c:ou rt cases a11 d the resu lting fsdure o~f the Supreme l.:ourt to recognize tl: ~.: taX{)norr.ty a11cl to
ad opt it ex plici tiy. Burns represented the fi rs t recognitio n that the
.h olding in r17ile:v turr1ed on the fac t th at it \VC.S a {~o lu rn n 1 case. But
Burns involved th,'= atypica i shift of •.vork of Column 3 an d hence could
not clarify the d ifferences between the more typical Column 2 an d
·C olu mn 1 cases . Golde n State Bottling Co. was the first Su preme
Court case in volving t he purchase of assets, but it in volved the narrow
iss ue of wh ether an asset purchaser, having purchased substanti a lly all
of the assets and having hired substan tially all of t he employees, succeeded to the d uty to remedy an unfair labor practice.: 11
Not until Howard Johnson di d t he Court deal with the critical C o lum n 2 issue: whe ther an asset purchaser succeeded to the CBA. The
Court correctly identified the importance of the difference bet ween
H oward Johnson's asset sale and W iley' s stock sale. In its Box 3 ruling, however, the Court planted the seeds of future con fusi on by stating that " ordinarily there is no basis for distingui shing among
mergers, consolidations, or purchases of assets in the analysis of successorship problems." 112 This unfortunate comment has led the
Board and lower courts into believing, incorrectly, that the d istinction
between transactions is irrelevant. Finally, the court d id not directly
resolve the Box 4 question until Fall R iver Dyeing in 1987 . 113 .<\.gain ,
the Court correctly used, but did not adop t, the corporate law·
taxonomy .
Our a pplication of the corporate taxo nom y to the labor context,
an.d the continuing evolution of the cases , shows t hat, despite d icta to
the contrary, the form of the transaction does in fa ct matter.
110. See, e.g.. Un ited States Ca n Co . v. N LRB, 984 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1993). Oddly,
altho ugh this was clea rly a merger- stock sale case (Column l ), all the parties li tiga ted th e case as
if it were a sale of assets case (Colum n 2).
111. The Court held that it did. Golden Sta te Bottli ng Co . v. N LRB . 4 14 U.S. 168, 180
( 1973).

11 2. Howard Johnso n Co. v. De troit Loca l Joint Executive Bd .. 417 U.S. 249, 257 ( !974).
The Cou rt no\ed th at it had previously reach ed th e sa me conc iu si un in Golden S101e, 4 14 U.S. nt
!68. ln Colden Stale the Court stated:
The refusa l to adopt a mod e of analysis requ irin g th e Board tc1 d istingui sh among merge rs,
consoli da ti ons, an d purchases of a:;sets is attribut ab le to th e fJct that , so long as there is a
con tinuit y in th e "employin g industry," the public policies und erlyi ng th e doc tr ine will be
served by its broad a pplication.
4 14 U.S. a t 182-33 n.5.
1\ 3. Fa ll Ri.,·e r Dyeing & Fin ishing Corp. v. N LRB, 482 U. S 27 (19 87).
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AJthough the Supreme Court has consistent ly lim ited its holdings
::ath er chan e ]~ p lic itl y adopting a corporate i:axonomy for th,:, labor
context, its d ecisions are fully consistent "With the taxonomy. Mo reover, a pplying the taxonomy to lov.;er court an d Board decisions resolves much of t he con fus ion concerning ·.vhich Supreme Court
preced. e:nt 2 p~~) lies in a given context. 11<·

l7Je Substantial Conti?nu ty ]'/,·reed
A s vve have shown, substantial continuity i.n operations and
v;or~forc~ p.lay important, but fundarr1entcJly differ,:r..t, roles in. the clif#
ferent boxes of th e labor law successorship taxonomy. ln Box 1, the
q uestion is whether the CBA carries forwa rd after a merger or stock
sale. In th is ar ea, substan tial con ti nui ty helps det ermine wheth er circurnstances have changed so substantially that the CBA can no longer
be a pplied . Circumstances after a stock sale or merger may chan ge
sufficiently for an arbitrator to conclude tha t t he CBA is no longer
applicable. In Box 2, the key issue is whether the duty to bargain
carries for ward after a m erger or stock sale. In Box 2 cases, substantial continuity helps d etermine w hethe r the firm can rebut the presum ption of continuing m ajor ity support of the union . The changes
sufficien t in Box 1 to render the CBA inapplicable m ay not, in Box 2,
be suffic ient to disturb an existi ng duty to bargain.
I n Column 2, substan tial continuity works differently. In Box 3,
t he critical questio n is whether the CBA carries forward to the asset
purchaser. The background rule is t hat no obligations carry forward,
but substantial continuity may crea te a rebuttable presumption th a t
places a burden on the asset purchaser to establish explicit rejection o f
the old CBA. In any event, the possibi li ty that the Board or the courts
may find constructive adoption in cases of substantiai con tinuity provides an incentive for asset purchasers to reject the old C BA ex pli ci tly
if t hey do not •.vish it to bind th em. By contrast, in Box 4, the questio n
is whet her the duty to bargain carries forward . In this area, substantial conti n uity de termines whether the fi rm or th e un io n bears th e burden of rebutt ing or establishing majority su p port. But, as in C olumn
1, the extent of continui ty suffi cient to tri gger a duty to bargain in Box
4 will not necessarily trigger a rebuttab le presu rnption in Box 3. Ind eed, the Spruce Up doctrine demands a great deal before irn.posing
114. Fo r examp le, i he freq uentl y debated rol e o f Wiley becomes ckZJ r. Co ntr ary to mu<.:h of
th e litera ture, see sourc es cit ed supra note 5, th e Supreme Court h:i:i nev er ove rturn ed or lim ii ed
Wiley. Wiley rem a in s today , as wh en fir st dec id ed, the case d efi ning the CBf·. ob ligat io ns of th e
stock pu rc hase r (Box 1) S ee John Wi ley & Son s, In c. v. Livings ton. 376 U .S. 54 3 (!964). The
error in be lievi ng tha t Wiley ev er had a broader scope res ul ted fro m a fa il u re to reco gni ze that
labor law cann ot ignore th e substant ive d istinc ti ons th a t a rise from co rro rate law .
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any obligation under the old CBA on the asset purchaser. In addition,
the scarce case law suggests that the shift of work cases, .Boxes 5 and
6, largely follow Boxes 3 and 4. The preceding reconstruction and
comparison of corporate and labor law successorship doctrine sets up
a puzzle. The doctrines provide strikingly similar treatments of those

cJ.airns on the firm . But diffefences ~;~;.is t ~:.s ~:ve iL
of these are re1a:ively srnall differences, such .as the r;.a.-t~ ~Jre e:f the
i:.;r~s u lnpti·Jns. ·O thei-s are rr1ore substantial, such as the ·j u Ly to ·b argain inrposed on the new firm in Boxes 4 and 6.
What vve find most intriguing is that the differen ces, ]c-:rge and
small, revolve in different ways around the same core concept : substantial continuity. M oreover, as noticed above, substantial continuity
bears a significan t relationship to what economists term the "i nternal
1abor market." 1 15 As we hope to show, this clue provides the key to
understanding labor law successorship doctrine and its relationsh ip to
corporate iaw successorship doctrine.
1rvith

con t rs~ct"Ga l

~c:n1~

HI.

AN OV ERVIEW OF THE ECONOMI CS OF INTERNAL
LABOR MARKETS

In the preceding reconstruction of the labor law successorship doctrines, we showed that a formal structure based on the corporate law
characteristics of the transactions at issue largely describes the courts'
and Board's opinions. We believe this analysis is significant because
the traditional labor law analyses, by ignoring the for mal corporate
la\N characteristics of transactions and focu sin g instead on the duty at
issue, 116 have fail ed to provide a workable taxonomy that d escribes
and predicts cases. The core of our theory of successorship is that t he
substantial continuity test, which plays such a central role in the labor
law successorship doctrines, is largely identical to the labor economists' question whether the internal labor market of the firm has
changed. 1 17 In this Part, we outline the i"elevant e:conornics literature
on interna) labor markets. 1 1s
115. See infra text accompanying note 130.
116. That is, the duty to arbitra te, the duty to adhere to the term s of th e contract. the duty to
ba rgain, and the duty to redress unfair labor practices.
117. The scope of an asse t sa le can be either broad er or narrowe r than the predecesso r" s
int ernal labor market (ILM). When the successor"s new ILM is eith er much broader o r narrO\ver than the pred ecesso r·s. a thresho ld question may be whether the new unit is an appropriate
barg::t inin g un it. In our di scuss ion of successorship, we assume init ia ll y an a ffirmative answer to
this th reshold ques tio n - that is, th a t th ere exists a union of the prcdecessor·s workers th a t is an
app ropriate ba rga inin g unit.
l l 8. Fo r a review and int egra tion of the economic analyses of internal labor rn a r!,e ts. see
Wachte r & W right, supra note 54, at 86-108 (citing sources and rev iews).
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The Internal Labor Market and the Protection of· 11-fatch-Spec fic
I nvestments

Labor economists disti nguish between tw o funda men tally diffe rent
labor markets. The external labor market (ELM) is the market in
w hi c h fi rms seek to fill vacancies an d workers se;:r~h for new jobs .

'The textbook EL0;1 is segmented by the general

the

·~,.vo rY.ers,

covers broad geograph ical regions, and contains large I! um bers of
firms and workers. H ence, both the sup ply an d demand sides of t he
market have numerous parties. There is also a considerable am ount of
information avai lable to the parties concerning prevailing wages a nd
unemployment rates. Because firms an d wo r kers have no investments
t hat are specific to the relationship, it can be terminated at low cost to
both parties. As a result, ELMs are typically competitive markets,
with little potential for super-competitive returns to one party coupled
with below-competitive returns to the other. In other words, there is
little potential for successful rent seeking. 119
Bu t, as long recognized, the textbook EUvf fail s to describe the
employment relationship observed within firms. 120 T his internal la bor
market (ILM) is very d ifferent. In the observed I LM , ftrms and wo rkers both make investments in their match, which are lost if the re lationship is terminated .
T hese investments encompass both
inves tments in identifying and training employees and jo int in vestments in the organization of work in a firm. Once tied together in the
ILM, relevant information is asymmetrically dist rib uted. F irms have
private information about product markets and conditions a nd ava i l~
able technologies while workers have information advan tages concernin g their own work effort and opportunity wages if a new job were
sought. As a result , the ILM, unlike the ELM, is not a competiti ve
market bu t, rat her, is better modeled as a bilat eral monopoly \vith con siderable po tenti al for re nt seeking.
Why might firms and workers volunta rily eschew the com petitive
E LM, with its pr otections, for the bilateral monopol y of t he ILIVI?
The ILM literature ad d resses this puzzle from two d irections. First,
ILM s generate surpluses over the returns available in the ELM, surpluses sufficientl y large that they leave both parties better off even afte r
the costs imposed by rent-seeking behavior. Second, th e struc tures
11 9. We define relll seekin g as the expe nditure of resou rces or efro n s by one party in order to
tran sfe r resourc es from the oth e r party to itself. This in vest me nt by the rent seek e rs is econo mica ll y wastefu l rela ti ve to the j oi nt profits o f th e pa rties, because it c reates no new wea lt h. Moreove r, re nt seek in g by one party typically ca uses th e prospect ive rent p;;y er to expend resourc es in
o rder to prot ect its sh a re of the joint inv estment. Becau se EL Ms in volve nu jotnt investm e nts,
they prov ide no op port unit y for re nt seek ing .
120. S ee Wachter & Wright, supra note 54, a t 241 & nn.2-3 .

1/'fichigan Law R eview

234

adopted m
,-oen.avwr.
'
.

internal Jabor markets constrain such

f 'VoL 92:2 03

rent-seeki:~:tg

I L M th eorists have identified four central economic Lctors t hB.t
affect a n ongoing em ploymen t relationship and that are n ecessary to
explain the observed pa tterns vv ithin I L M s: (1) firm- or match -:::p:':c~itlc training; (2) risk C).ve-rsic n; (3) asyrrE~netri c inh;rrnatio:n. ; 2.nd. {l})
t:8J1sa.ction c o ~ts .! 21 It...e.lyi.ng on 6 co1T1bination. of these fac tors, IJ._j\ti
theor ists have been able "to an a lyze ot her\v ise puzzling but \Vides pre ?~d
features of the em ployment relat ionship as incentive-compatibie co n tracts designed to solve t he twin p roblems endemic to I L Ms: narnely
to encourage the optimal m a tch -specific in vestmen ts while dete rri ng
the parties from using their asy mmetric info rmation in a ren t-seeking
manner. 122
From this perspective, for example, one can understand why both
the firm a nd the worker typically invest in the match: it encourages
the maintenance of the relationship. If only one party made such a
commit ment , the noninvesting party could "hold up" the other party,
threatening to term inate the relationshi p un less a h igher return were
paid. Such a th reat wou ld be credib le because the investing party, but
not t he threatening party, would lose the return on its match-specific
investment. By contrast, joint investments deter such behavior: because t he threatening party would absorb a loss in carryin g out its
threat to terminate the relatio nship, the opportunity to use such a
threat in a rent -seeking manner is redu ced. 123
The IL?V:{ contract is ongoing and forward-looking. Invest rr:ent is
continuous, and the parties will continue to deal with each other ?.lS
long as match -specific returns continue to be available and as long as
contin uing match -s pecific in vestments receive adequate protectio n .
The governance structure for those ongoing relationshi ps m ay be rela··
ti vely exp licit, as in the union sector, or implicit, as in the nonu nion
sector. In either case, unless rules can be devis ed to d eal with n ew
contingencies, the parties \vi ll lose the joint surpluses created by effi cient IUvis.

121. See id. at 90 -99.
122. Incen tive - compa ti ble co ntrac t terms are term s that ma ke it in th e interest of bo th pa rties to maximize th e joint surplu s avail ab le to th em .
12 3. Ot her exam ples of in ce ntiv e-compatibl e te rms are sen iority clauses, wage p rofiles th at
increase with exper ience , reduc tion s in employm ent rather than wages dur ing d ec lin es in e:: onomic ac tivity, and unilatera l implem e!ltatio n by firm s of d ec ision s a ffec tin g le ve ls o f outpu t a nd
produc t p rices. Fo r a discu ssio n of th ese feature >, see Wachter & W ri ght , supra note 54. at 9499.
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The IL11f Analysis of Temporary Layoffs, Discharge for Ca use,
::m d .F'.::nn anen.t Reductions in Force

The economic issues raised b y successorship are similar to the issues raised by other rnanagement actions that have a substantial impact on th.e ern plcy rr; .::n~ relatlonstli p. In thi s se{:tion V/ ~ take the ftrst
steps toYvard evaluati ng 'Hhether the Sllccessorship rules of L-lbcr laV·/
are i nc entive - cornpat~bi.c: by considering the ILM the orists' a n;1lysis o f
the termination of t h~~ em ployment relationship in other sii :Jat ions:
discharge for cause, tem porary layoffs, and permanent red uctions in
force. In each of t hese cases, t he observed practices appear to prefer
permanent red uctions in emplo yment over less severe adjust ments.
vVhile this may initiall y seem to conflict with the presum ed interest of
the parties in maintainin g t he employment relationship, the threat of
em ploym en t red uction is indeed incentive-compatible for joint-profit
maximization, wh ile less severe adjustments would not be.
For exam ple, firm s ra rely make minor reductions in wages to di scipline workers who shirk . I nstead , they typi call y d ischarge the workers, thereby te rminating the relationship. T he explanation for t his
behavior rests on the fact that \vorkers know their work effort , but
fir m s do no t. Firm s can learn by monitoring, but constan t mon itoring
is very costly . To save on costs, firm s monitor workers infrequentl y.
T h e low detection rate d rives t he h arsh penalty for shirking. If most
sh irking goes undetected because of the high monitoring costs, fi rms
must penalize workers an a m ount greater than the expected loss of any
specific incident. The penalty must be set so that the expected cost to
t he workers of shirking eq uals the loss to the firm . \Vhen detec ti on
rates are low, th e penalty is ve ry high to raise the expected val ue to
required levels . Conversely, to encourage workers to consummate
work effort, the fi rm must offer rewards when it learns of superior
effort. 124
But the penalty for shirki ng cannot be a wage reduction. If the
fi.rm co uld simpiy declare th at a grou p of workers were un de rpe r forming and cut their v;ages, firms would hav e an incent ive to overstate the
degree of sh irking, thereby reducing costs an d increasing profits.
Forcing firms to discharge workers eliminates the firm's incent ive to
overstate the d egree of sh irking because it force s firm s to lose valued
\V orkers in the process . 125
A parailel analysis explains the observed behavior of firm s in re 12<l· . See id. at 248·49.
125. See M ich ae l H. R iordan & Michael L. Wachte r, Wha! Do fmp !icil Con1rac ls Do?. 1982
P ROC. l~DUS . REL. Rr.:;. ;\,SSN. 29 1, 295 (Ba rbara D. Dennis ed.).
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sponse to cyclical changes in output: firm s typically reduce employmen t rather than wage rates . Fi:crns, but not workers, possess direct
information about prod uct market conditions. The firm informs its
workforce about product ma rket co nditions indirectly through
changes in output . If a firm could lmver wages in response to a decl ine
in its product market, it wo uld hav:::: an in cen tive to misstate the co nd ition of its product market in order to lowe r wage rates. The incenti vecompatible rule is for the firm to lay off workers. Because the result of
the layoffs is a red uction in output, and hence a reduction in the firm 's
revenues and profits, such a ru le eliminates the firm's incentive to misstate information.l 26
The rules concerning firms that exit, an industry parallel those governing temporary layoffs. A firm retains the right to decide unilaterally to go out of business, just as the worker enjoys the unilateral righ t
to quit the firm. 127 The process of going out of business, however, is
frequently a prolonged one. Stylized rules have evolved to govern the
"effects" on workers of the decision to close: firms typically lay off
workers over time using a seniority schedule; workers typically receive
some severance pay and always receive their pension rights; if firms
discharge older workers before younger ones, they do so through voluntary retirement mechanisms in which the "contract" of the older
workers is bought out. T hese process rules are almost always part of
union contracts. 128
T he rule that firms can unilaterall y implement a decision to go out
of business has strong incentive-compatible properties. Once out of
business, the firm has lost whatever value is in the ILM. Hence, the
firm will only close when the I LM is indeed unprofitable. The rules
governing the process control the firm's incentives to profit from the
process, or to pretend to be going out of business, by imposing direct
costs (severance pay or voluntary retirement programs) and ind irect
costs (laying off less expensive j unior workers before more expensive
senior workers) on such a firm .
T he above analysis extends to successorship . T he key factor driving the incentive-compatible rules in this area is that the firm and the
match-specific workers have an ongoing interest in preserving an ILM
when it generates a surplus over the ELM. W hen the ILM generates
126. For a general disc uss io n o f contr:Jcts that contro l firm strat egic behav ior with respect to
product market conditi o ns, see id. a t 250.
127. T ex til e Work e rs Uni o n v. Darlin g ton , 380 U.S. 263 , 26 8, 27 1 ( 1965); see also First N a t!.
Mai nte na nce Corp. v. NLRB , 452 U S 66 8, 677 ( 19 8 1).
128. LLOYD G. REYN OLDS. ST ..,NI..EY H. MAST ERS . & COLLETTA H. MOSER, LABOR E CO·
& LAB OR REL ATI ONS 4 7 1- 76 ( lOt h ed. 199 1). F o r a ge ne ra l disc uss ion of how pa rties
use stylized rul es to ad a pt to c han ges in circ umstances, see Ri o rdan & Wachte r, supra no te 125 .
:--~o~ncs
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economic losses, the long-run joint profits of the firm and the workers
would be improved by establishi ng a new ILM. The obligations of the
surviving firm turn on whether or not the firm reestablishes or retains
the ILM of the old firm .
C.

The Problern }aced by Labor Law Successorship Docirine

From an ILM perspective, th ree situations are of interest in det erm ining whether successorship doctrine d eters rent seeking.
Case A: The ILM of the old firm creat~s a surplus; the new firm
recogni zes that the ILM creates a surplus; and the new firm, in order to
preserve the efficient ILM, wi llin gly retains the old firm's employees and
assumes the CBA and the duty to bargain. Case A apparently characterizes most changes of control and rarely leads to litigation. 129 When the
new firm wishes to acquire t he old firm as a going business, and to continue it as such, the new firm has no reason to disrupt established and
efficient labor relations. Consolidations are difficult enough without
making them more so by sowing discord. The easiest way to accomplish
Case A transitions is by a merger or stock sale.
Case B: The ILM of the old firm is defective, either creating no surplus or incurring losses; the new firm recognizes th at the old ILM is
defective; the new firm reconfigures the operations, in cluding personnel
practices and structures, and hires few if any of the o ld firm 's workers.
Case B transitions are typically asset sales. Case B cases are largely selfenforcing: the firm makes credibl e its assertion that the ILM generates
no surplus by jettisoning it. By di ssolving the old ILM, the firm precludes itself from capturing joint surp lus generated by that ILM.
Case C: The ILM of the old firm is efficient, but the new firm denie s
that any surplus ex ists; at the same time, the new firm attempts to capture the joint surplus by hiring most of the old firm's employees at a
wage closer to th e employ ees' opport unity wage and by refusin g to bargain collectively. In Case C, the new firm tries to have it both ways. It
tries to maintain an efficient ILM while reducing the share of the joint
surplus paid to th e workers. Unlike Case B situations, the new firm 's
representation is not self-enfo rcing. By (mis)representing that no joint
surplus ex ists, perhaps by threatening not to hire the old workers except
at lower wages, the firm creates a basis for reducing workers' wages and thus their share of the surplus - while at the sa m e time maintaining
and benefiting from the efftcient ILM.

The task of labor law successorship doctrine, then, is best und erstood as faci litating Case A and Case B transitions, while preven ting
Case C transitions. A failur e to control the opportunistic behavior of
Case C will undermine the creation and maintenance of productive

ILMs.
129. This is an anecd o tal imp ression. We do not kn ow of any ev ide nce on the relati ve frequency of Cases A, B , and C.
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UNDE RSTAND THE LABOR LAW

SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINES

As we have seen above, substantial continuity 1-:1 operations and
workfo rce plays an important but d ifferent role in <::ach box of the ta;(o nomy . Strikingly, the substantia! con tinuity test that form s the cor::
of the labor law successorship doctrine ~·oughl y tracks th e co:nti:rmi ty
of the ILM. In de termining whether substa;1tio.l continuity in operatio ns and workforce exists, the courts and the Bo::u d. examine a
number of fac tors :
whether the business of both employers is essen ti ally the same; whether
the employees of the new company are doing th e sa me jobs in th e same
working conditions under the same supervisors; and w hether the nev;
entit y has the sa me production process, prod uces th e same products, and
basically has the same body of customers. 130

F inally, the courts and the Board examine whether there is substantial
overlap in the identity of the emp loyees . T h ese factors rather precisely
describe the situations in which the new firm retains the old firm's
ILM. Thus, the substantial continuity test identifies those cases in
which the new firm is in a position to act opportunistically. In this
Part, we describe how labor law successorship doctrine can be u nderstood as an attempt to control opportunistic behavior by firms - and ,
to a lesser extent, by employees- that ca n t h reaten p roductive I LMs.

A.
i.

Column 1: Merger and S tock Sa les

Box 1: Obligations Under the CBA After a i'vferger or Stock Sale

As previously discussed, a merger or stock saie does not affect
rights and obligations under the CBA. 13 1 In the normal case, Case A,
the new owners desire to acquire the old firm as a going concern , in··
eluding its I LM either by means of a stock sale or a iTterger. Th e rule
of Box 1 faci litates such transitions and pro~ ec ts thi rd parties by leaving intact rights and liabilities of t he old firm. The rule limits t he op·
portunities for the contracting parties -- both t he employer and the
union - to demand renegotiation of contracts at the delicate and vu lnerable period during which control is transferred. 132 T he typical fact
130. Fall River Dy eing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 4 82 U.S 27 . 43 (1 9 87).
131. See supra not es 55· 63 a nd accompanying text.
132. The battle fo r con tro l of United Airlines provid es a good e.\ample oi the strat egic use of
renegotiation at the point that con trol is transferred. During th ~ piloi union·s a ttempt to gain
co ntrol of U nited, t he machinists fo rm ed a coalition with th e m a nagement and inserted a provi·
sian in the collecti ve ba rga in in g agree ment w hich te rmina ted the machinists• collect ive barga in·
ing ag ree m e nt u po n c han ge o f cont ro L This action posed a s ubst a nt ial ba rrier to the pi lo ts·
a tt empt to ga in cont rol becau se it gave th e mac hi n ist s th e o pti o n to st r ike upon a c hange o f
con trol a nd would t herefo re d isco ura ge le nd ers w ho p referred noi to .. k •1d into a strike . ., T h ~
ma nage rs benefited fr o m thi s pr ov ision insofar as it di scou raged bid s, while the m:tchinists bene·

November 1993]

Successorship

239

pattern for a Box 1 case IS a stock sale after which the new owners
rep udiate the old CBA while accepti ng the benefits of corporate continl)it y, including tax bend1ts and the continuation of advantageous
contracts, leases, or licenses. 133
f'J ~Yt e how the essen tiall y categorical rule of Box 1 prevents the
::>ppon;.:!li.s!ic behavior of Case C. Esrnark., Inc. v. N LR.B 13 ~ provides
:3. \VO nderful example. Esmark, a conglomerate, owned the leading
rneat packer, Swift & Co. Swift's fresh meat operations had been losing money. Esmark claimed that, although Swift's plants were effi:::ierit in tbat the workers were productive and the output was of high
quality, the wage rates at two (Moultrie and Guymon) rendered them
uncompetitive in comparison to other plants in the industry. Esmark
thus attempted to retain their ILMs but to lower wage rates by reorganizing operations in such a way as to put the two plants ou tside the
mas ter CBA. In addition, Esmark wanted to sell sixty-five percent of
th e fres h meat operations to the public, retaining a thirty-five percent
interest. Five days before the public offering, Esmark closed the
Moultrie and Guymon plants and laid off the workers. Eight days
after the public offering, an official of New Sipco, the subsidiary that
now held the two plants, informed the union that it would reopen
them and that, as a "successor employer," it would unilaterally set
(lower) wage rates.
Esmark's public sale of sixty-five percent of the stock in the subsidiary holding the fresh meat operations presented a classic Box 1 situation: D oes the corporation remain bound by its obligations under the
C BA after the sale of a majority of its stock to new owners? Following
Wiley, the court affirmed the Board's holding that the obligations survived the stock sale. 13 5
T he corporate law considerations discussed earlier show why this
r>~sult makes sense. In this case, one purpose of using a stock sale
rather than an asset sale was to maintain and transfer the enterprise
intact, including its ILM. 136 In such circumstances, to treat the firm 's
tited to th e extent. that it allowed them to claim a sha re of an y m erger gains. See John C. Coffee,
Jr. , Unstable Coa!ilions: Corporaie Governance as a Jful!i-Piayer Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495
(1990) .
i 33 . See. e.g., Esmark, In c. v. NLRB, 88 7 F.2d 739. 744-45 (7th
NLRB. 345 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1988); Genera l T eams te rs Local
Trucking, lnc, 493 F.2d 956,958 (3d Cir. 1974) : Phillip Wall & Sons,
! 16 3-64 ( 1988); Topinka"s Country H o use, in c ., 235 N.L.R.B. 72, 73

Cir. 1989); EPE. In c. v.
Union No. 249 v. Bil!"s
inc, 287 N.L.R.B. 1161.
(197 8).

134. 887 F.:Z.d 739 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. 887 F2d a t 752.
136. As the cou rt noted:
Esm ark de liberately chose to dispose of Swift \ l'resh meat s divisi o n as an ongo ing, se lfs ufficient entcrrrise. rat her than to se ll it s physi ca l asse ts pi ece mea l. Esmar·J..: undoubtedly
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obligations to its employees less favorably than its contracts with
others, aliowing the firm to pick and choose which of its obligations to
its employees to adopt , would undermine a transactional form whose
va lue lies largely in the way it predictably and maximall y maintains
continuity. 13 7 Undermining the categorical quality of the mergerstock S?.le rule, in turn , wo uld invite opportunistic beha-.;ior by th e
employer and the union in the Case A situ a tions th at, under c:Jrrent
doc trine, pass largely unlitigated.
In contrast to these typi cal Box 1 cases, sometimes a merger results
in the old firm's absorpti on into the surviving firm, with the \Vor k and
workers di spersed and integrated or dismissed . 138 This represents a
Case B type situation: by integrating the old ILM into its existing
ILM, the firm indicates that it does not believe the old ILM is genera ting a surplus. 139 In the Wiley case, for example, the Int erscience
workers were integrated into the larger Wiley workforce.
Under the rule of Box 1, these employees receive the same protection as other creditors of the firm. The surviving firm is liable for any
obligations under the old CBA. At the same time, the surviving firm
has no greater obligations than the old firm. Just as the old firm typically could dissolve the ILM by changing the nature of its operations
so significantly as to render the old CBA inapplicable, so too can the
new firm. 140 When, as in the Wiley case, the new firm credibl y asserts
that it does not value the old ILM - either by integrating the worke rs
into its larger operations or by not retaining the old workers - it may
bel ieved that th e form o f t he t ra nsac ti on would be advantageous, d ue to the tax conse quences and because Sipco·s co ntracts (including favorabl e loan ag ree m ents, leases and contracts with suppliers and cus tome rs) would continue in fo rce.
88 7 F.2d at 751.
I 37 . T he court see med to be searc hing for this view in Esmark without eve r quite a rti cu lating it. In rejec tin g E smark' s a rgum en t. the court stat ed that adoption "wo uld undermin e t he
fundamen ta l goal of the federal labor laws, which is to ens ure indu stria l peace and srabiliry. An
e mp loyee shoul d no t have to wonder whet her his employe r w ill con tinu e to adhere to hi s co nt rac t ua l ob liga tion s eve r y tim e th e e mpl oye r's stock is trad ed o n a stock exc h ange." 887 F.2d a t
752. But why should th e e mpl oyee have tha t reass ura nce? One answer is th a t s uch reass ur a nct!
is just a nd prom o tes ind ustri a l peace. As a legal theor y, howeve r, th at a nswe r does not exp la tn
the cases: if reassurance promo tes justice a nd industrial peace h ere, why not also guarantee it in
cases involving a sa le of assets (Box 3) o r a sh ift of work (Box 5)? Th e backg rou nd corporat e bw
theory ofrc rs an alt e rnati ve expla nati o n fo r why the reass urance is c riti ca l. an explanation th at
ca n dis tin g uish between Box I cases like Esmark and Box 3 and Box 5 cases like Hu>mrd Johnson
and Burns. See also cases cit ed supra no te 133, in which th e stock purchaser tried to avoid t he
ob li ga ti o ns under th e CBA, whil e e nj oy in g benefits of o th er co ntinuing con tracts. licenses . or
leases.

138. See. e.g. John Wiley & So ns, Inc. v. Li vings to n, 376 U.S. 543 ( 1964) (d is persed and
int egra ted ): Lauer's Furniture Sto res, In c. 246 N .L.R.B. 360 (1 979) (d ism issed ).
139. Or. a t leas t, that the sur pl us is less t han that ge ne ra ted by it s ow n !LM.
140. Th is. of course, ass u mes t hat th e C BA docs no t have a c la use res tri c ting t he c han ges
under considera ti on. Lik e o t he rs lin ked to the firm by co nt ract, the ba rga in ed -fo r rights o f ei ther
the fi rm or the union wi ll be pro tec ted.
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do so. Such an assertion is credible because, by disso lving the old
ILM, the firm p recludes itself from capturing an y surplus generated by
the old ILM .
Here, then , is an important contrast between Esma rk a nd Wiley.
I n Esma rk, the surviving firm could not claim that th e CBA becam e
inapplicable because of permitted changes in th e organizat ion of the
work and workers: the o perations at the two plants cont inued enti re ly
unchanged . By contrast, in Wiley, the Interscience wo rkforce was
completely absorbed into the larger Wiley operation, a reorgan izati on
permitted under the C BA. The rule of Box 1 thus provides the neces·
sary fl ex ibility to reorganize or dissolve an ILM when it fa ils to generate a surplus, without interfering with the efficient - and largely
uncontested - transfer of going concerns. Placing the burden on the
employer to establish lack of continuity is consistent '.Vith our casual
observation that, in the normal Box 1 case, the surviving firm or stock
purchaser will keep the old ILM intact.
2.

Box 2: Obligations Under the NLRA After a
Merger or Stock Sale

The rule of Box 2 follows that of Box 1: after a merger or stock
sale, the surviving firm has the same duty to bargain as the old firm.
T he corporate and ILM perspectives largely account for this result. In
Case A situations, the most common type, this rule maxi mally preserves continuity. At the same time, in Case B situations, w hen th e
new firm believes that the old ILM is unproductive, the rule provid es
the same way out as was available to the old firm. If the new firm can
meet the burden of establishing that the union does not have continued majority support , then it need not bargain. As previously discussed, to establish thi s the new firm, like the old firm, must establish
lack of continuity in o perations and workforce . 14 1
W hile permitting a way out of the duty to bargain for firm s that in
fact do not desire to continue the old ILM, however, thi s r ule largely
blocks th e Case C attempt to have the best of both worlds, that is, the
attempt to benefit from the old ILM while rep ud iating the d ut y to
bargain. In the classic Case C situation, the new owners retain the ol d
ILIV1 but attempt to secure a greater share of the joint surplus. The
n ew owners, for exam ple , may misinterpret the condition of the product m arkets. "Sales are bad, " the new owner might say, "we just can't
afford to maintain the old wage rates." Alternatively , th e new own er
may attempt to maintain the o ld ILM organization but eliminate the
14 1. See supra no tes 65 -63 an d acco mpa nyin g text.
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old wo rkers. Box 2 blocks both strategies. T hus, in Esmark, in ·w h ich
the old firm was preserved entirely intact with the same -.vorkers an d
the same operations, t he court correctly held that the duty t o bargain
con tinued unchanged rh rough the sale of stock. Because t he I LI\,1
contin ued, th-::: nev1 ovmer could not rebut the presum pti~)n o f contin-

ued majority

su ppc~ rt.

But nOYV r:ontra.st _Es!rtarl.:: \V it h ~oencer ~Foods l·+l a:nct .iq_ OC.k.H/QO::{
Energy. l-D Spen cer Foods presents the trickier case. The origin&.l owners ciosed t he plant and laid off the ·workers. A ft er an eigl-1te:en-month
hiat us, following a stodc s2Je, the new owners reorgani zed operz.tio:r:s
slightly and reopened t he plant. The new Spencer Foods refused to
bargain with the old union, accepted applications from all in teres ted
persons - including former employees - but hired oniy a very small
proportion of fo rm er Spencer employees. The union charged - and
the ad ministrative law judge, the Board, and the court all agreed that Spencer Foods relied 01 1 hiring criteria designed to keep the former unionized Spencer emp loyees to a minimum and t hus keep the
uni on ou t of the plan t. 144
The court held that, because the layoffs were not intended to be
permanent, but only part of the "sale of an ongoing business enterprise
to [Land O'La kes], i.e., a business which encompassed the resumed
operations of th e Spencer plant by [Spencer Foods] albeit under new
management," 145 a nd because t here was an expectation that t he plant
wo uld be reo pened, the duty to bargain carried forward beyond th e
expirat ion of th e C BA and through the hiatus. Moreover, the co urt
held that applying disc riminatory criteria to avoid rehiring old wo rkers was itself an unfa ir labor practice.
From the I L M perspective, Spencer Foods is more problematic
th an Esmark. At first blus h , it seerns to involve a classic Case B situation: the new Spencer Foods, by not rehiring t he old employees, m ade
clear that it d id not value the old ILIVL The old Spencer Food 's history of poor labor relations is consisten t with t h is hypothesis. \Vh ile
in Esm ark the firm attem p ted to have it both ways - to retain the
I LM but avoid bargair, ing with the union - the new Spencer F oods
put its mo ney on the line . Hmv, t hen, could Spencer Foods have been
behaving opportunistically?
Doct ri nally, the answer is straightfonvard : a n tiunion ani rnus is al 142. Uni ted Food & Commerc ia l Workers Inti. Union v. N LRB, 768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir.
1985 ).
143.

·~ LR B v.

R oc kw ood Energy & M inera i Corp., 94-2 F.2d 169 (3d C ir. 1991).

!44. 768 F2d a t 147 5.

145. 768 f.2cl at 1472.
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\vays an unfair labor practice. 146 Moreover, t he econom1c rationale
.for this general rule is similarly straightforward. 'Nhhont such 2, bar,
V!orkers -·Nould be unable to escape from their free-rider problerns and
bargain col.lectively . H ence, if unions can facilii:ate effi ci en t conTracting in ILMs, a rule prohibiting antiunion anirnus is necessary.
B ut t he successorshi p co ntext _
itsr:;1f also pro vicl ~:3 c.Tt ans v;e1·. (~ Dn -~
~:idcr c. b road er tin1e frame. Sappose th a t in th e .fi.rst period th ':: Errn
.tefus es to re11ire forrner employees ln o r-d e r to keep o ut t1~tt; urlic::n, ·but
du ring the second period it rehires the skilled form·~r em ployee::; as it
termina tes t he unsk illed and inex perienced new hi.res. 147 Und er such
circum stances, in the second period th e -.vorkcrs would have to bea r
t he cost and delay of reo rganizing and renegotiating, having just suf~
fe rec! an extended layoff due to their union membership . By delaying
the reestablishment of the efficient ILM in order to eiiminate the
union, the firm might secure a greater share of the joint surplus. Inck:ed, more gene rally, given the. ' the division of the joint surplus like other bilateral monopolies - depends on the ba rgaining abilities
of th e participants, investing in a reputation for toughness m ay be
wort hwhile. 148
N ote the limitations of this explanation . In this two-period strategy, the firm incurs a cost during the first period: it forgoes its share of
the j oint surplus of the efficient I LM an d ris ks losing em ployees in
who m it has made a match-specific investment . The strategy makes
se:nse only if the employer can recoup this investment, with interest, in
the second period - either after it reesta bli shes the old I L M , or from
2.n increased share of the joint surplus from other I LMs w ithin the
i1rm, that is, from other divisions. 1-+ 9 In :Spencer Foods, this is a plausib le scenario in that Land O'Lakes had numerous other di,;isi on s.
ivioreover, had there been no iitigation, Spencer Foods could have
jc;6. Labor Man ag em ent Relations (T aft-Hartley) Aci , P ub. L No . 80-101, § 8(a)(3), 6 1
Stat. 136, 140 (codified as a mended at 29 U.S.C. § i5 8(a )( 3) (19 38)): T ext il e Wo rk e rs Unio n v.
D arlington Mfg. Co. , 380 U.S . 263 ( 1965). S ee genem!!y I TH E DE VELOPING L/>.30 R L.-\ \V .
supra not e i, at 185-249, 275- 84.
147. Spencer Foods prov ides o ne possible exampl e. Th e Board found th at , in the first year
fo il ow in g the sa le of asse ts, Spencer Foods hired approximately 525 ind ividu2ls , released 250,
nnd so ught to fill 220 projected periods ; th e Board not ed the relative in ex peri en ce of man y hires .
United Food & Commerc ia l Worke rs Intl. Uni o n v. N LRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 14 75 (D. C. C ir.
1985).

148. T he cbssic case of an tiuni o n an imu s, Darling ron, res ted on si mil a r concr;ms. The Cou rt
i t:a so ncd that Darlin gton closed one of it s piant:; to teach wurk:::rs in its ot her pb"t:; not to
union ize. 380 U .S. a t 275 -76.
!49. Predat o ry pric in g in antitru sl provides an analogous case. In a predatory pricin g str<l ta firn·t lowers ]t s pri ces below cos t to d ri ve con1pet it o r ~; o ut of lh e n1urkct a nd , hav in g ga ined
rnar!<e t pow er, ch arges an ab ov e ·~ompetitive prl ct~ . Brook G roup Ltd. v. Brow n & \Villian1 so n
Tobacco Co rp ., ! 13 S. Ct. 2578 ( 1993); see a.'so Phillip A re·:!Ca & Do rd d F. -r urn er, PTedotory
.F'ricin g and Related Priorities Under S ec tion 2 of th e Sh ennan Act, 88 HAK \ ' . L . REV. 6g7 (1975).
egy~
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been expected to rehire the experienced workers as it fired the inexperienced workers. But, if recoupment is impossible, it is unlikely that
the initial decision was opportunistic. 150
In contrast to the court's analysis in Spencer Foods, Rockwood Energy i 5 1 seems inconsistent with the goai of preventing opportunistic
t:el-:::::•,io r. In 198 1, H armony M ining Co . c:iitered into 3 co lkctive bargai ni ng :1greement effective through September 1984. T he CBA pro. ' . tnat
'
"'leJm
' ' p 1oyees w h o are !Lie
. 1' oecause ot a reuuct:on
.-.1
•
•
t.
·!lo.eei
m
tile
'.Vorki:ng fo rce shall be placed on a panei from whic h they shall be
returned to employment on the basis of seniority." 152 In May , 1982,
:H armony suspended production and laid off forty unit employees. In
198 3, R ockwood Energy and M ineral Corp. , Harmony's major creditor, acquired all of R ockwood's stock. In 1985, after the termination
of the CBA, Harmony unilaterally began to change the terms for the
sole remaining unit em ployee. In 1986, Harmony hired one additional
nonu nion em ployee to do work that union mem bers had previously
performed. I n 1987, Harmony resumed production, hiring two additional em ployees without regard to the panel, of whom only one was a
former union member. Four laid-off union members inquired abo ut
jobs but were told that the company was not accepting applications. 153
T he union requested bargaining and, when Harmony refused, filed
an unfair labor practice complaint. The Board ordered th at Harmony
recognize and bargain with the union , that Harmony not unilaterally
cha nge the terms and conditions of employment established by the
now expired CBA, and that Harmony recall laid-off employees in accordance with the seniority provisions of the CBA. 154 The Third Circuit enforced the order, finding that the Board had reasonably held
that the new employer was a "continuation " of the old notwithstanding the long hiat us in production and lack of substantial work force
contin uity. 155 The obligations under the prior CBA a nd the duty to
barga in both carried over.
1

-

150. As in the a nalogous case of predatory pricing. Sec. e.g .. Broo/.: Group. 11 3 S. Ct. at
25 88 -89 (holding t ha t a pl a int iff mus t s how that it s co m pe tit or had a reason ab le pros pect of
reco uping its inves tm ent in below-cost prices to recove r damages in a n action for predatory pricin g) .
This ex pl ana ti on has an important problem. If employe es kn ow of a firm's reputa tion as
ant iuni on before th ey invest in the match, then work e rs in the compe titiv e e xternal labo r market
s hou ld demand a prem ium for joining this particular finn. In such ca ses , the firm wou ld likely
bear t he cost of it s reputation.

15 1. N LRB v. Rockwood E ne rgy & Mine ral Corp .. 942 F.2d 169 (3d C ir. 199 1).
152. 942 F.2d at 172.

15.1 9-\2 F.2d a t 172.
154. 94 2 F.2d at 172-73.

155. 942 F.2d at 174- 75.
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In contrast to Esmark and Spencer Foods, the facts here, though
not entirely clear, suggest that Rockwood Energy presents a Case B
situJ.tion . The fundamenta l change in operations associated wi th reduc ing from forty workers to four, combined with the company's decis~on not to re hire the oid em ployees, suggests that Rockvvood Energy
·'·/ C1"';es a self-enforcing statemen t that the old II.jv1 generate(} no S1.;:r ~·
plus. ~B y terrnin2.ting the old ILI\1, tbe con1pany p r e c 1~ u d ec1 itself fr o:rn
8.cLing oppo rtu nistically. B ut \Ve :ba \/C oo fe \.v facts to u nd er s t a T1:~
Rockwood E nergy fully . If, for example, the company were to e~\ pa nd
its operations back to its former ievel, with foriy emplo yees, then the
case >-vo uld resemble Spencer Foods.
Under this analysis, the opportunistic behavior present in Esmark
makes clear that the sale of stock does not an d shou ld not affect the
d uty to bargain. Rather, the ILM perspective suggests that the substantial continuity determination - that is, the q uestion whether t he
ILM is carried forward - should be critical to deciding w h ether the
d uty to bargain continues. When, as apparen tly occurred in Rockwood E nergy, t he firm constrains itself from behaving opportunistically by disband ing the old ILM, imposing a d uty to bargain is iikely
to reduce joint profits. Moreover, because the purpose of imposing
such a duty is to preclude opportunistic or wasteful strategic behavior,
its imposition serves no purpose in such a context. Focusing d irectly
on substantial continuity , moreover, promotes these purposes more effec ti vely t ha n focusing on the existence of continued majority union
support in the workforce - the traditional, and doctrinal, test. 15 6
Rockwood E nergy, for instance, may have been able to reb ut a presumption of majorit y status. Doing so, however, would ha ve been
quit e costly , dissipating the efficiency gains from its reo rganization of
th e company.
B.

Column 2: Safe of Assets

I n the paradigmatic sale of assets, the asset purchaser wishes only
to acq uire pieces of the asset seller, not to acquire the asset seller as a
going concern. The normal Column 2 case is th us a Case B situation:
the asset purchaser does not value the old ILM and, by jettisoning it ,
precludes itself from capturing any of the old I LM 's joint surplus.
1 mportantly, C ase B situations are largely self-en forcing . In t hese
cases, the firm 's representation t hat the old ILM is inefficient, com bined wi th the firm's actions in reconfiguring th e assets and not hiring
i 56. Fo r a d isc uss ion of t he traditiona l m ajority s up port tes t, sec supra not es 6 5- 68 and
ac com pany ing te.\t.
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the old workers, makes the assertion inherently credible. By dissolvim::o_.. the old I LM.' the fi.:rm Duts its money where its mouth i.s. W hile
t he finn may be wrong - it may be that, contrary to the fir m 's assertion, the old ILM creates joint surplus - it cannot be acti ng
opporttJnistically.
T11tls, in the Case J9 situation, in v/hich the asset purchaser d.oes
no t c.c~ nti n u e tl1e old o peration or hire ·~h e •Jld \vorkers, tl-1er e is no
c~:rnti nu in g I L~vl that requires protection ; he11cc the la·w treats t.h ·e forrner '.vorkc:rs exactiy the same as an y other cred itor of t he firm . '<?/hen
t he IL M is discon tinued , the backward- looking corporate law p ro tection of creditors of the asset seller protects former employees' contractual claims. Wor kers may collect from the asset seller anything to
·whic h they are contractually entitled under the CB.A - for exarnp1e,
un paid wages, accrued vacation pay, accrued pension contributions,
and so forth -- but that is a ll. T he asset purchaser has no special
obligations to the seller's emplo yees.
M:oreover, such a rule helps to discourage both the destruction of
producti ve ILMs and the preservation of un productive lLMs. A n
IL.M may be inefficient because the workers have used their right to
strike to extract a contract that transfers the firm's share of the surplus
to the workers. 157 Similarly, workers m ay want to retain an ILM
wh ich is inefficient for other reasons in order to maintain contract provisions that return a surplus to them, even wh en the firm is generating
losses. In both cases, a predecessor firm st uck with such an inefficient
! LM can jettison it through an asset sal e. Faced with the potentia l
exit of the firm through an asset sale, workers will be less likely to use
their bargaining power to extract a surplus that leaves the firm with
losses.
~.Chat the prototy pical Column 2 case in volves an inefficient IL1'v1
also explains why Column 2 has differen t rules th an C olumn 1. The
corporate law goal of encouraging effici ent restructuring of t hose assets that do n ot generate a surplus, while retaining those that do, requires standard form mechanisms that can be applied to the two
situations at 1ovv cost. This explains why Wiley, contrary to the expect<;.tio Tl s of traditional labor law scholars, did no t apply to Column 2. 15 8
O f course, as in the corporate context, a background rule that asset
IJurchasers do not take on the seller' s obligations creates the potential
for C ase C strategic manipulation. T his rule offers asset purchasers an
opportunity to retain the productive old ILM, but secure a larger
A

i57. See infra the d isc ussi o n of "po tentially effi cient" ILMs w no te 172 and acc om pany ing
15 3. See supm secti on i! .C.
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sh are of the joint surplus, by using an asset sale rather th;-ln ft rnerge:in order to escape fro111 tl1e old ~CBA_ and the ·d uty to b a rr ~~dn . (:Dn s~ - 
quentiy, asset buyers and se llers will have an incentive to share in the
additio 1al portion of the joint surplus that the sale so.ptures from the
en1ployees.
-r:l ~:: ch alle nge f~'Jr the lega l rule is to presetv(: the necessar_
y ·\l p~:iu ::·.~.
of disst.=:!. ~..:ing an inefficient 1Llv1 a11d disposin g of asset3 v;l-dJ ~:: bl ocl(ing
t he opporrur1istic use of th a t transact ional fo rr11. ·rhe rules of Boxes 3
and 4 represent an attempt to do this. Bec:::mse Box 3 pos,'::s the m ~Js ;~
difficult questions, we iNill first examine the rule of Bo;:: 4.

1.

Box 4: Obligations Under the NLRA After an Asset Sa ie

Recall the rule of Box 4: when there is no substantial continuity,
there is no duty to bargain collectively until the union establishes majority support; when t here is substantial continuity, majority sup port is
presumed, and the firm must bargain collectively until it establishes
lack of majority support. 159 As discussed above, when the c!SSet purchaser jettisons the old ILM, as demonstrated by lack of substantial
continuity, no danger exists of opportunistic behavior on t he part of
the firm . But when the asset purchaser retains the oid I LM, a potential for opportunistic behavior arises that courts must constrain in order to facilitate optimal investments in ILMs.
The necessity of controlling this sort of opportunistic behavior p rovides a n ex planation for why labor law successorship doctrine gra n ts
greater protection to employees than corporate law successorship doctrine grants to creditors generally. In the general corpo rate case,
courts protect creditors either by requiring that the asset seller rnake
provision for long- tai l claimants before d issolution or by using asset
purchasers as a conduit to impose the costs on asset sellers . But the
II..Iv'l d iffers significantly: labor law successorship doctrine must p rotect th e forw ard- looking, match-specific investments in th e continuing

ILM .
The duty to bargain is critical to labor lav/s attem pt to constrain
op portunistic behavior while facilitating nonop portunistic recon figurations of assets. H ere we must clarify the content of the duty to b;;trgai n
a nd the extent to which it can protect employees. In referring to a
" duty to ba rgain," vve are referring to the weak, proced ural versio n of
the duty: an obligation to meet and confer " in good f2.ith' ' ov:::r
mandato ry topics , without an y obligation to reach an agreemen t. 16iJ
159. Sec supra notes 87-88 and accompanying tt xt.
160. Sel' ge nerally l TH E D EV ELOP IN G LABOR LA W, sup ra note l, ch. 13.
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Such a d uty to barg ai n will facilitate the renegotiation of terms an d
cond iti or:,s equivalent to t hose in the p rior LLM . B ut this duty only
protects workers in wh o m the firm has m ade productive investm ents .
h d oes norhing to protect em p loyees wh o are easily r eplaced. In par··
ti cula.r, tl-,e du t y to bargain will not allow such em p loyees to p rotect
s.ny u.:r1ior-1 \V::~.ge prem iu rns that tl-1ey p rev iously secured in the o1d
CB A.

16

~

The duty to bargain constrains opport u nis tic behavior in t h is con text in tvvo \Vays . F irst, by relieving th e union fr om the burden or
::.hawing mzj orit y su pport -- w it h th e a ttendant costs of o ,·ganizin g
and costs of delay - im posing a duty to bargain lowers t h e em ployees'
costs of p rotecting or reestab lishing the bargain over the div ision of
the joi nt surpl us th a t they had previously struck wit h t he asset seller.
Seco nd, b y forcing the asset buyer to corroborate cla ims rega rd ing th e
condition o f the product markets, this duty makes it more di ffic ult for
the new employer to secure a greater share of the joint surplus b y
misrepresentation.
Consider, for example, Fa ll River, 162 in w hich a majority of t h e
asset purchaser's wo rkforce had worked for the asset seller, doin g essen tially t he sa me work. In such circumstances, employees face a con tinuing danger that the purc haser will act opportunistically, claiming
t ha t th e ILM is inefficient in order to appropriate a portion of th e join t
surplus whiie at t he same time taking fu ll benefit of its va lue. I m posing a d uty to bargai n h elps to m aintain t he presumptively efficient
ILM while preventi ng the a sset purchaser from using the uncertaint y
of th e changeover to secure a greater share of the joint surplus.
·Moreover, such a rule imposes a minimal burden on the asset purchaser. H the purchaser values the ILM , as demonstrated by its d eci ·
sion to contin ue operations and to hire the old employees, then it must
continue the p rac tice of bargaining collectively . If, on the other hand,
the purch aser does not value the ILM, it will not hire the old em ployees and ¥vil l have no obligation to bargai n collectively. I ndeed, in Fall
R iver t he Su preme Court seemed largel y to have made a versio n of this
argumen t:
T h us, to a su bstantial ex tent the applicability of B urns rests in the ha nds
161. Th e ext ent to whi c h labo r law should or does protec t uni on wage premi a for un s kil !t:d
wo r kers is a con trove rsia l to pi c a nd we ll beyond th e scope of this a rticle. For one view of th is
topi c, see gen e rall y M ic hael W ac ht e r, Union Wage Rigidiry: The Defa ulr Seuings of L abor Law.
AM . EcoN. R Ev., M ay 19 86, a t 240. However on e co mes o ut o n th i! no rm a ti ve issue. mos t ag ree
that the N LR A as app li ed prov id es rela ti vel y littl e pro tec ti o n fo r wo rk ers easil y re placed in the
E LM. La bo r la w successo rshi p d oc trine, as recons tr uc ted here, is thu s no less pro tec ti ve o f such
workers tha n o the r a reas of la bo r law .
162 . Fall River Dye ing & F in is h ing Corp. v. N LR B, 48 2 U.S . 27 (1 987) .
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of the successor. If the nevi employer makes a conscious decision to
maintain generally the same busi ness and to hire a majority of its r:::m··
ployees from the predecessor, then the bargaining obiigation of§ 8(a) (5)
is activat ed. T hi s makes sense wh en one co nsiders that the employer
intends to tak e advantage of th e train ed work force of its predecessor. 163

The rule proh ibiting discrimination against em ployees of the asset

seller on th e basis of th eir union In ernbersl1ip reen ter:3 a this point. u_.,.:,_
As with Box 2, if the asset purc haser coul d mai ~ tain operations un~
changed but escape from the duty to bargai n - by refusing to hire
former union members or by refusing to reco gnize the union - t hen
an opportunity wo uld exist for unproductive strategic beh avior. 16 5
The rule against antiunion animus blocks this prospect. If an asset
purchaser leaves operations unchan ged but employs practices that effectively excl ude former union employees, such action constitutes evidence of antiunion animus. After all, so long as operations a re
unchanged, one would expect that the old employees in whom the firm
has made match-specific investments would be the most attractive candidates. If a firm disproportionally excludes t he most attractive applicants, one can infer that it excluded them in order to keep out the
union. 166 By contrast, when no substantial continuity in operations
exists, no such inference arises. To the extent t hat the o peration s are
changed, the match-specific investments in and .JY the old employees
have little value- indeed, t hey may even impose a cost- and criteria
of selection t hat have the effect of hiring new workers do not suggest
ammus.
But this ILM explanation for the rule of Box 4 presents a puzzle:
if the duty to bargain is part of the old I LM and is therefore appro priately imposed on an asset purchaser who retains the old I L M , why not
also impose the old CBA, which is its constitutive document? The
doctrinal answer has been t hat the N LRA prevents the imposition of
an agreement on a firm. But that justification begs the q uestion: it
does not expiain why the NLRA should distinguish between asset purchasers - who are not necessarily deem ed to adopt a CBA even if
they hire a m ajority of the employees - and stock purchasers, vvho
. are deemed to accept the existing CBA.

163. 482 U.S. a : 40 -41.
164. See supra notes 141-46 and accompan ying text.
165. See supra tex t acco mpan yin g no tes 146-50.
166. See. e.g.. United Stat es Marine Co rp . v. NLRB. 944 F.2cl 1305 , 1315-17 (DC. C ir.
199 1), cert. den ied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1 992); Un it ed Food & Co mmercia l \Vo rk ers Inti. Union v.
NLRB, 768 F.:?.d 1463. 14 7-\-7 6 (D. C. Cir. 19 85)
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Box 3: Obligations Under the CBA After an Asset Safe

As discussed earlier, the rule governing Box 3 is complex. in general, when a firm acquires assets, it need not fu lfil the obligati ons of the
seller's collective barg :1ining agreement, un less it agrees to accept
those obligations. 161 T h>:: Board a nd t he cot;rts l1ave outlined the ci r-

curr:stances in v;hich the:,r vFdl hold th.2ft a. ftcm has agre~(i to t2 k~ en
the seller's CBt':. in the 2~ioru.ce Up dDctrin e. 16 x Proof of suC:.tantia1
continuity in operations 2.nd \vork:forc .~ s:~erns to make it sigr1ificant ly
more likely that the Board a nd courts will find th at the CBA ha~ been
adopted, evid.ence 'Nhich the asset purchaser can rebut with 2. clear
statement at the outset that it does no t intend to adhere to th e old
CBA. The uncertain and fac t-specific nature of the legal ru le p uts
pressure on the purchaser to declare its intentions, explicitly rejecting
the old CBA at the outset if it d oes not w ish to adhere to it.
T his complex rule seems to be a necessari ly imperfect solutio:-1 to a
difficult problem. The core of the Box 3 rule com ports w ith ILM considerations . A new owner who wishes to redeploy the assets of the
firm might find that goal di ffi cult to accomplish if bound by an existing
C BA. Allowing the new owner to reject the CBA t hus furthers the
corporate law goal of encouraging the mobili ty of assets to the most
profitable use. M oreover, when an asset purchaser acquires assets but
redeploys t hem a nd hires new employees, we face an obvious Case B
situation. By dissolving the old I LIVi, the asset purchaser precludes
itself from acting opportuuistically.
H oward Johnson 169 presents just such a nonoppo rt unistic Box 3
scenario. Howard Johnson acquired the physical assets from the Grissoms but chose to redep lo y t hem and to hire new employees. By n ot
hiring the old t:mployees, Ho ward Johnson made it clear that it did
not value the old ILM. M oreover, this claim was self-enforcing: by
not hiring ihe o ld employees, it also ga ve up th e surplus, if any, from
t he JLM. Instead, Howard Johnson sough t to redeploy the assets in
what it thought would be a more effective fa shion.
1
N hile Howard Johnson had no continuing duties to t he o ld employees, it does not folloYi that th e old employees had no protections .
To the contrary, they reta ined all their contrac tu al rights. Indeed, the
Grissoms agreed to arbitrate the extent o f their lia bility to the union
and their former em ployees under the C BA . Moreover, as the Court
pointed out, because the old em ployees' CBA contained a successor
167. See supra sec ti on !!.C. I.
168. See supra not es 98 -1 0 1 a nd :1ccornpany in g text.
169. H owa rd Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint E.>:<::<:ut ive Bel. , 4 17 U.S. 249 ( 1974).

N ovember 1993]

Successo;·ship

251

and assigns clause, they could have sought an injunction against the
Grissorns to er1joirl tf1e sale as a breach. (J f tile SJ..l ccessorship clause. 170
But a rule that gives the asset purchaser the opt ion to reject the old
CBA presents the possibility of a Cast-; C situation. The asset purchas-::r who can retain the old ILM - as d-~monstr::rttd by h iring the
old e~-n p1oyees and ret~l.in i ng the old operaticns --- but \vho can reject
Lh\.: o1:j CB"£\ and u~I·latera 1 1y set te ~- rn s L~;Id conditions rnay be able to
capture some additiona.t elerr1ents of the joi nt su rplu.sJ subject to a contin ui ng duty to bargain.
()ne mechanisrn for constraining such o pportunistic behavior is a

rule that wo uld automaticall y impose the old CBA on the asset purchaser who retained the old ILM. In such cases, the asset purchaser
could not unilaterally set terms; rather, it would have to wait until the
CBA expired and then bargain to impasse, or, if the CBA had already
expired, bargain to impasse, maintaining the old terms for the year or
two it took to do so. 171
But such a rule has its costs. In particular, when the I LM generates surpluses over the external labor market but wage premiums exceed the joint surplus, asset purchasers either will not purchase the
assets or will not retain the ILM. Such ILMs m ight be termed "potentially efficient" ILMs, that is, ILMs that would generate a joint surplus at contract terms that fe ll betvveen the old CBA and a new CBA
and that would pass a market test of attracting new workers. In such
circumstances, a legal rule that provides a process for the parties to
retain such IL?v!s, but with different CBA terms, will maximize the
parties' joint gains. 172
The rule of Box 3 seems to be an attempt to accomplish just such a
goal. By rebuttably inferring the constructive adoption of the old
CBA when substantial continuity exists, the law forces the asset purchaser to reject the old CBA expl icitly before it can uni laterally set
initial terms. This obligation to reject the old CBA explicitly, combined with an obligation to bargain , provides substantial protection for
employees' match-specific investments. A firm '.vhich mu st repudiate
the old CBA explicitly - at the very time it seeks both to hire the old
170. 4 17 U.S. at 25 8 n.J .
17 1. The Fifth Circuit adopted t hi s approach in United States G ypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 19 67), cen. denied. 389 U S. 10·+2 (1968) . For~ discussion o f
Gyps!lm, see supra note 96. Other courts have chaned a middl e gro un d: imposin g a duty to
bargain about initial terms but not imposin g th e n isti ng CBA. See, e.g.. JC :l!m:Jnn v. NLRB , 640
F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1981). When a CBA has no t expired, this does not affec t initial
terms but red uces th e time until impasse is reach ed .
172. The process is thu s somewh:lt analogous to a chapt er 11 reorgani zati o n: th e " go ing
co ncern·· value of the !L M is re ta in ed wh il e the claim s o n the cash fl ow a re reduced to a su stainable level.
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workers at lower wages amd preserve the old ILM intact - must accept the risk of disrupting its jointly profitab le relationships with its
employees during that difficult transition period. When the ILM is
efficient, this sort of behavior is particularly risky because any gain
may be tem porary at best, given that t he firm will still have a duty to
bargain. Indeed, gains may be non::xistent because the union may get
e';erything back. As a con tinu ing participant in the ILM, rnoreover,
the firn1's strong interest in maintaining its reputa tior1 may also con-

strain opportunistic behavior when eit her the joint surplus of the present ILM is relatively large, or the prospective gain from opport un istic
behavior is relatively smal l.
Saks & Co. v. NLRB 173 presents an example of a permissible,
nonopportunistic scenario. Saks, which formerly shared a building
and an alterations department with Gimbels, moved to a separate
building. Most of the employees in Saks' new alterations department
had worked for Gimbels on Saks alterations. Saks made it clear at the
outset that it would not adopt Gimbels' CBA. In such a case, Saks'
implicit assertion that the wage rates of the old ILM were uncompetitive is at least partially bonded by the risk it takes of losing experienced workers.
By contrast, NLRB v. World Evangelism, Inc. 174 presents an
opportunistic scenario, which the rule of Box 3 blocks. World
Evangelism (WEI) purchased a hotel- office- convention center complex. Shortly before the takeover, W E I decided to retain the engineers
but did not state whether or not it would adopt the CBA. W hen the
engineers heard this, they threatened to resign unless WEI adopted the
old CBA. \VEl's representative assured the engineers that WEI would
adopt the CBA. When the engineers subsequently presented a CBA,
\VEI refused to sign and, over the succeeding months, paid the engineers below the contractual rate. Subsequently, WEI notified the
union that it had not adopted the ol d CBA . I n that case, W EI, having
maintained the productive ILIYI intact d uri ng the critical transition
period - the period during which the emp loyees' bargaining power
was at its zenith - subsequently sought to change the terms unilaterall y, capturing a larger share of the joint surplus. The court, applying
the Spruce Up doctrine, held WEI to the terms of the old CBA. 175
17 3. 634 F2d 681 (2d C ir. 19 80).
174. 656 F2d 1349 (9t h Cir. 198 1).
175. 656 F.2d at 1355-56. Bellingham Frozen Food s, In c. v. NL RB , 626 F.2d 674 (9th C ir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1125 (19 8 1), presents a simil a r bu t less d ra matic sce nari o. I n th a t
case, th e asset purc hase r (Bellin gham) inform a ll y asked " rnpl oyees to rema in in th ei r c urre nt
positions with ou t ha vi ng to rea pply. It first indicated th a t it int en d ed u nilaterall y to ch an ge th e
terms and condit ions of empl oy m ent a week after the changeove r a nd transfer of operati o ns.
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The rule of Box 3, then, allows asset purchasers to avoid the old
CBA even when they retain the old workforce if they explicitly reject
the CBA in advance. One might object, however, that this rule invites
opportunistic behavior: firm X could sell the assets of its d ivision Y to
firm A, while firm A sells the assets of its division B to firm X. Because
each firm could reject the CBA of t he newly acquired di visi on, fi rms
wou ld have an incenti ve to ass ist one a noth er, reciprocall y or se rially,
in escaping from coliective bargain ing obl igations .
O ur answer to this obj ection lies in considerin g the joint effect of
Box 3 and Box 4 rules. Recall that, while a fi rm that purchases assets
may repudiate the CBA, it may still h ave a statu tory duty to bargain.
The bargaining obligation survives independently of the CBA and provides extra protections for workers in asset sales. 17 6 Thus, a new
owner who rejects the existing CBA but retains the old workers is
likely to find that it has also retained the duty to bargain. In such
cases, the duty to bargain provides those workers who have matchspeci fic investments with an opportunity to reinstate the CBA protections they enjoyed with the prior owner. The preceding objection, in
this light, demonstrates the power of our analysis. T he rule of Box 3
reflects current law: firms legally could engage in exactly the sort of
opportunistic behavior that the objection suggests. But there is no evidence that they do. The absence of such behavior provides strong evidence of the efficacy of the current legal structure in preventing
opportunistic behavior. The duty to bargain, even without an additional duty to abide by the terms of the old CBA, seems to make this
tempting strategy unprofitable. 177
C.

Column 3: Shift of Work

Labor law, unlike corporate law, presents a third sort of paradi gm
case: the shift of work case. In these cases, the forward-looking nat ure of labor law successorship doctrine most clearl y com es to the
fore. In corporate law, a competitor who ta kes over an account and,
after doing so, contracts with some of the loser's input suppliers owes
no obligations to the creditors of the loser. But labor law , wi th its
focus on the potential gains to the new employer of retaining the old
ILM, takes a different approach. As discussed above, 17 8 the Burns
case hold s that, in a shift of work context, the ne w employer who
maintains substantial continuity, principally determin ed by hiring the
!76. See supra notes !07-09 a nd accompan yin g text.
!77. Such evid ence is no t, however, co nclu sive: fi rm s mi ght no t engage in suc h behavior fo r
o!her reaso ns, such as

tO

avoid unfavo rabl e tax co nseque nces.

!78. See supra notes 102-09 a nd accom pany ing text.
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loser's employees, takes on a duty to bargain collectively bu t not a
d uty to abide by the old CBA. Again, it is useful to consider the duty
to bargain , Box 6, before the obl igations under the old CBA., Box 5.

1.

Box 6: The Duty To Bargain After a Shift of f'Yo r k.

A.s discussed above, the r ule Gf Box 6 is t hat, 'Nhen ~he:e is =~
:-;tarnial conti n uity, the new employer has a duty to bargain coL::c ~
tively. 179 The demands of the ILl\11 explain th is ob ligation tha t departs
so striki ngl y from the parallel corporate law rule. As discussed abc-,'e,
the "substantial continuity" test identifies those situatio ns in whid 1 i:h•::
ILM is preserved. 180 The ILM is, however, both bac kwa rd and forward looking: both the firm and the employees have sunk and m ake
continuing firm-specific investments, investments that t he governance
device of the duty to bargain serves to protect. When the new firm
con tinues the old ILM, imposing the duty to bargain protects those
ongoing investments and thus promotes an optimal level of
investment.
A second theme of the shift of work cases is asymmetry of information and the resulting inequality of bargaining power, a factor that
ILM theorists have identified as important in explaining ILMs . The
new employer apparently does not act opportunistically, as it had no
prior relationship with the employees and has no contractual relationship with the old employer. Nonetheless, the new em ployer is in a
position to misrepresent its intentions strategically in order to retain
the efficient ILM while reducing the workers' share of the joint surplus. T his theme appears clearly in Fall River: "During a transition
between employers, a union is in a pec uliarly vulnerable position . It
has no formal and established bargaining relationship with the ne w
employer, is uncertain about t he new employer's plans, an d cannot be
sure if or when the new employer must bargain with it." 18 1 To ex plain
the imposition of the duty to bargain, an element of oppor tunism,
asymmetric information, or unequal bargaining power is necessary.
Otherwise, one would expect that if, indeed, the duty to bargain f~lciii
tates optimal investment in the ILM, the new firm wo uld voluntarily
bargain collectively.
T he Bums 18 2 case illustrates both feature s of the analysis. I n reh iring the Wacke nhut guards to perform the same work in t he s2.me
plant in largely the same way, Burns acknowledged by its actions th e
179. S ee supra notes 106 - 09 an d acc ompanying text.
180 . See supra note 130 a nd accompanying text.
181. Fall River Dyeing & finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 4 82 U.S . 27, 39 (1987 ).
182. NLRB v. Bu rns Inti. Sec . Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1 972 ).
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fun damental soundness of the Wackenhut ILM. If, as labor law Implicitly assumts, the duty to bargain is the iow-cost procedurai mec hanism for the establishment and maintenance of efficient ILMs, one
woul.d expect Burns to have accepted it voluntarily. But by assu ming
Lhis duty Burns would have given up an important bargaining chip:
th·:: abi iity tc cap ture a greater share of the joint surplus by misrc pre ·
.:;;~c~ing to th e old employees the state of the produ ct ma rket, t he c 1n·
ployrnent rnarkets, or the efficiency of the ILM vvhile taking ad\··antage
of the employees' costs of reorganizing a union and the attendan t
.jelay.

Similarly, in Spruce Up, 18 3 the new concessionaire expressed a willingness to hire the old barbers although it rejected the old CBA. By
doing so, Spruce Up made clear that it valued the old ILM. In such
circumstances, to force employees to reestablish a duty to bargain
would disrupt the governance structure of an efficient ILrvf, giving
Spruce Up an opportunity to grab a larger share of the joint surplus. 18 4
As in Box 4, however, the new employer has no obligation to ret 'lin the predecessor's employees, nor has it any duty to bargain if
those v·;orkers are not retained. Both of these rules protect nonoppo rtunistic, self-enforcing decisions, as was true in Box 4.
In his Burns dissent, Justice Rehnquist questioned the relationship
between the Burns maj ority opinion and the successorship issues in
Box 6. He pointed out that, although the Court "studiously avoids
using the term 'successorship' ... it affirms the conclusions of the
Board and the Court of Appeals . .. which were based entirely on the
successorship doctrine." 185 Justice Rehnquist then concluded that the
B1Jrns employees should be protected in the transfer of assets in the
ss.me manner as nonlabor claimants, rather than enjoy additional
clo.ims not tied to the assets actually transferred. 1 86 This conclusion,
of course, would be the correct result if Box 6 were backward looking,
as is corporate law when it applies a conduit theory to protect lon gtailed tort claimants. Box 6, however, looks fon.vard and is tied to the
continuity of the ILM. The retention of the ILM, and its future suri83. Spruce Up Corp. , 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 5 16 (4th Cir 19 75).
i 84 . For essent ially identical situ a tion s, see NLRB v. New Medico H ealt h Care Ctr. , 951
:r:·.2 d 350 (6th Cir. 1991) (opinion at No. 91-5271. 199 1 WL 276260 (Dec. 20, 199 1)), ceri. denial.
112 S. Ct 2965 (1 992); Auto M ec hani cs Loca l Lodge No. 11 0 1 v. N LRB, 945 F.2d 408 (9Ih Cir.
i99J) (op ini on at No. 90-70096, 1991 WL 197005 (Oct. 3, 19 9 1)): Nazareth Regional High Sch .
., . NLRB, 549 f.2 d 87 3 (3d Cir. ! 977).

185. o,06 U.S. at 296 (Rc:hnquist. J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part).
i 86. 406 U.S. at 304-05 (Rehnquist. J.. concurring in pan and di ss enting in part );

supra note 109 .
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plus, are the key issues, rather than the disposition of the ph ysical
assets.
Still , Box 6 cases are unusual. Typically, the retention of th e I LIYJ
involves the retention of the physical assets of the ILM . The decision
to scrap the old assets is likely to relate closely to th e decision to scr2,p
:i-le ILM. Hence, Box 6 cases, like Burns, are most li kely to aris;; in
rhr: con text of subcontracting, w hen the phys ical assets empl oyed in
the I LM beiong largely to th e contractor and thus are retai ned \Vith
the wo rkers.
2.

Box 5: Obligations Under the CBA After a Shzft of Work

T he rule of Box 5 is that, after a shift of work, the new employer
need not follow the old CBA. 18 7 Suppose, however, that the new em ployer hires all of the loser' s employees and deploys them in the same
way doing the same work. Why is there no more than a slight and
easily rebuttable presumption in favor of the old collective bargain ing
agreement?
As with Box 6, the ILM considerations that justify the Column 2
boxes largely carry over. Because of the reduced danger of opportunistic behavior, however, those considerations become even more powerful. The paradigm Box 5 case is the potentially efficient ILM , that
is, an ILM tha t is otherwise productive except, say, fo r uncompeti tively high wage premiums. Permitting the Box 5 employer un ila terally to set initial terms maximizes the chances of preserving such
ILMs to the mutual benefit of the firm, the employees, and society.
I mposing the duty to bargain protects employees from Case C opportunis tic behavi or. By contrast, imposing the old CBA as the in itial
terms wo uld doom borderline ILMs to unnecessary ex tinction.
In Burns, the fact that Burns could offer a lower pri ce for the
Lockheed cont ract and still hire a sufficient number of guards to provide the services to Lockheed provides substantial evidence that, while
the Wackenhut I LM was fundamentally sound, the wages paid un de r
the contract rendered Wackenh ut uncompetitive. By permitting
Burns to hire the employees, at a lower wage, the Court allowed for
the preservation of the potentially efficient Wackenhu t ILM . I mposing the duty to bargain on Burns protected the former 'Wackenhut
guard s from any attempt by Burns to capture a disproportionate share
of the joint surplus generated by their joint activiti es.
!87. See supra notes 103-05 a nd accom panyin g tex t.
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Remaining Puzzles

The preceding account of labor law successorship doctrine leaves
several puzzles. First, we distinguish between Case B and Case C o n
the grounds that in Case B , but not in Case C, the new firm's rep r esen tat ion that t he I LM is defective is self~enforcing. This raises t h e ques ..
tio n \vhy , in Case C, ernployees V/\.) Uld believe such a representatic, rL
The firm 's failure in Case C to put its rnoney where its mouth is m akes
its statement inherently suspect.
The answer is related to in fo rmation asymmetries. W hi le the
firm's representation might not be cred ible given full info rm ation, employees lack full information. The firm's information as to the margi ·
nal product of the workers is partly private, depending on product
prices and technology (known to the firm) and worker effort (know n
to the employees). This asymmetry of information and the associated
potential for opportunistic beha vior, we argue, partly explains wh y
parties in a low transaction cost setting would adopt the labor law
successorship doctrine.
But opportunistic behavior may still occur, even under an optimal
labor law successorship regime. At best, labor law successorship doctrine will maintain and protect a bargaining process. Because the ILM
creates a bilateral monopoly, however, the outcome of that bargaining
process - the division of the joint surplus -will depend on the relative bargaining abi lities of the parties. In this process, shrewd negotiators for a firm may successfully manipulate information to argue
credibly t hat product market conditions are adverse when they in fact
are favor able, thereb y increasing the fi rm's share.
The second puzzle is related to the first. In the corporate law
cases, the law views creditors as largely able to protect themselves by
contract. Unknown future claimants represent the principal exception: the y canno t protect themselves because they do not kno w they
even have a claim , much less its magnit ude, and typica lly lack a con··
tractual re lationship wit h the firm. But why do we also treat employees differently? Unlike future products liability claimants, employees
do have an ongoing contractual relationship with the firm. W h y
sho uld the law do anything more than enforce the CBA? 188
O ne answer is unpersuasive. Some have argued that t he relative
absence of explicit con tractual protection stems from employee ignorance of the problem of asset purchasers behaving opportunisticall y. 1x9
If the problem were one of asymmetric information , however, it would
188 . -1-06 U.S. at 30-1--06 ( Rchnqui s t, J., conc urrin g in part a nd di sse ntin g in part) .
189. H y lton & H y lt o n, supra note 5, a t 849-50.
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be self-correcting. As opportunistic behavior becomes known, the hypothesis of continued ignoro.nce becor.n.es less cr edible. I\·ioreover, ii: is
inconsistent with the presence of successorship protection in some collective bargaining agreements.
A more persuasive justification for this protection is tha t collective
action p1·ob lerns arnong e r-n p J.oyees rn ake it diffi cult to cor1t r act for tf1e
efficient lev:el of pro tection. \\rh.ile union leadersl1ip rnay understand
the problen·1 of successorstlip, ex plaining tt1 is problem to the rank ar1d
file may prove difficuit, especially in tenns of a trade-off against wages.
T his accmmt predicts and is consistent \Vi th the casual observation
that explicit successorship protection is more common in national contracts - where the rank and file has relatively less impact - than in
single plant contracts. 190
T he primary explanation for these legal protections, however, is
that the ILM is a continuing reiationship. 'while the CBA has a term ination date, the parties' understanding is that contract expiration is
primarily a time to reset or update some of the parameters of the
agreement. Since the parties do not view termination of a CBA, and
any intervals between CBAs, as an end to the relationship, the parties
retain an ongoing duty to bargain to form a new contract. The duty to
bargain continues as long as the relationship remains intact and a new
owner who retains the ILM does not disturb that duty. This continuity preserves productive ILMs and thereby benefits both the new
employer and th e workers .
COt'ICLUSION

The labor law successorship doctrine has bedeviled courts and labor law commentators for years. To many, it has seemed arbitrary,
formalistic, and morally wrong. Traditional labor law scholars, using
traditional labor law categories, have been u11able to explain or predict
its development or provide any sort of justification for its peculiar
features.
In this article, we have started from the very form a lism that the
traditional commentators have rejected --- the corporate law distinc-·
tion between mergers and asset sales. From that distinction, and frorn
a more general analysis of corporate successorship doctrine, we have
generated a taxonomy that organizes the doctrine.
Once we organize the d octrine by referen ce to corporate law's
analysis of successorship, ·we can explain the differences between the
190. Discussion at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Law and Econon1ics Labor
Law Roundtable (May 1. 1992).
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two bodies of law by focusi n g on the differences in the relationship
between employees and the firm and others who contract with the
firm. \~/hat distinguishes the employee-firm relationship is the existence of I L Ms; which, because of match-specific investments, create the
potential for ongoing joint profits o r surpluses above those offered by
EI}Jis. Th is pot:::;;ti2.l for continuing p:ofi ts, hmw~ver, also creat-es a
greB.ter poteY"Jtia1 for opportu~nistic ~ r ent ·~ seek ing behavior. By s.nalyz.~
ing io.bor la\!/ successorship doctri ne from the ILr·vf pers·p ective, \vifh
its foe;""' on the fo , wa rd·· looking creati on of jo int surplus, we can explain \vhy em ployees receive greater protection in stock arcl asset sales
than creditors receive generally. At the same time, I Lfvi considerations explain why even greater protections, the sort favored by many
labor law commentators \vho use the standard labor paradigm, are not
on ly unnecessary but also potentialiy harmful to the joint interests of
the firm and the workers.
But the I L M perspective alone does not fully explain the comp1e;<ities of labor successorship doctrine. A full explanation also requires
the application of the corporate law paradigm. This paradigm distinguishes between stock saies and mergers - as the standard form
mechanism for transferring a whole business as a going concern -on
the one hand, and asset sales -- as the standard form for transferring
businesses piecemeal - on the other.

The relevance of the corporate law paradigm explains why Wiley 19 1 was only the first of many cases in labor law successorship. The
Wiley doctrine could not be applied broad ly , as both advocated and
predicted by traditional labo r la·.v commentators. The Wiley issue of
contract enforcement following a merger fundamentally d iffers from
the issues that arise in the absence of a contract (Box 2) and from
those that arise after an asset sale (Boxes 3 and 4). At the same time,
we show why Wiley, correctly interpreted, has never been overturned
or even lim ited . It \vas at the time, and remains today, the correct rule
for Box 1 cases .
The relevance of the corporate law paradigm. also shows why the
Court's assertion in H oward Johnson 19 2 that the nature of the corporate transaction was not a central feature of that case was misplaced.
Even when lowe r courts put the subs tance of the substantial continuity
doctrine ahead of the form of the corporat e transaction, they fi nd that
th e form of the transaction predicts the correct application of the substantial continuity doctrine . Form and substance are closely related.
!91. J ohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.·,·. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (!964).
192. ;-J:oward Joh nson C<.l . v. Detroit Local Joint Executi ve fld., 4!7 U.S. 249 ( 19 74).
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To explain the curious application of successorsh ip doctrine to
Colum n 3 shift of work cases, ho·wever, the corporate law paradigm is
of only limited help. Only the theory of the ILM, which sees the potential for future profits in continui ng I LMs, adequately explains the
need for protection in such con tex ts. The substant ial continuity of the
ILM in Bunzs 193 is ini ti a lly a puzzle beca use the new owner neither
purchased the stock no r the 3.ssets of the pred ecessor. The explanation
for t his puzzle is that many of the I L~·A's physical assets were owned
by the contractor, Lockheed . "YVhen Lockheed shifted the work from
\Vackenhut to Burn s, the impact on the ILM was almost identical to
an asset sale.
T his article illustrates the power of economics to cast light on similar legal doctrines th at develop in related fie ld s. Capital and labor are
two of the principal in puts to the firm . Both corporate law and labor
law address the problem of successorship, of the extent to which those
who acq uire the firm in whole or in part mus t ass ume the obliga tions
of the seller. We show in this article that many of the differences in
labor and corporate law's treatment of successorshi p derive from fundamental economic differences in the firm' s relationship with creditors, as suppliers of capital , and its relationship with employees, as
suppliers of labor.

193. N L RB v. Burns IntL Sec. Se rvs. , In c., 406 U.S. 272 (1 972 ).

- - - -- - -·- ---

